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Abstract
Many separable dynamic incentive problems have primal recursive formulations
in which utility promises serve as state variables. We associate families of dual recur-
sive problems with these by selectively dualizing constraints. We make transparent
the connections between recursive primal and dual approaches, relate value iteration
under each and give conditions for such value iteration to be convergent to the true
value function.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic incentive models have received widespread application in ﬁnance and macroe-
conomics. Theyhave been used to provide micro-foundations for market incompleteness,
ﬁrm capital structure and bankruptcy law. In macroeconomics, ﬁrst Ramsey and later
more general Mirrlees models have informed thinking on tax policy and social insurance.
In each of these varied cases, the associated dynamic incentive problem recovers equilib-
rium payoffs and outcomes from a game played by a population of privately informed
∗We thank seminar participants at LSE, Yale and Washington Universities for comments. We are espe-
cially grateful to ¸ Sevin Yeltekin for many helpful discussions.
†Department of Economics and IGIER, Bocconi University, I-20136, Milan, Italy;
matthias.messner@unibocconi.it.
‡Department of Economics and IGIER, Bocconi University, I-20136, Milan, Italy; Department of Eco-
nomics, EUI, I-50133 Firenze, Italy; CEPR and IFS, London; pavoni.nicola@gmail.com.
§Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA 15217; csleet@andrew.cmu.edu.
1or uncommitted agents and, often, a committed mechanism designer or principal. Equi-
librium restrictions from the game provide the problem’s constraints and given additive
separability of payoffs over histories, tractable recursive primal and dual formulations
are available. In contrast to many other problems in economics, however, this recursiv-
ity is often implicit and these formulations must be recovered from the payoff/constraint
structure via the addition of constraints that deﬁne state variables or through the manipu-
lation of a Lagrangian. Recursive formulations of dynamic incentive problems have been
developed in different contexts by Kydland and Prescott (1980), Abreu et al (1990), Green
(1987), Spear and Srivastava (1987), Fernandes and Phelan (2000), Judd et al (2003) and
Marcet and Marimon (1999). Each of these papers uses or develops a particular method
and several consider a particular application. Our goal is to provide a uniﬁed treatment
of recursive primal and dual approaches for dynamic incentive problems. We use basic
results from the theory of dynamic programming and duality, especially conjugate func-
tion duality, to do so. We emphasize practical issues associated with the application of
these methods and identify when particular methods are valid. We relate value iteration
under each method and give conditions for it to be convergent to the true value function.
Our starting point is the well known primal recursive formulation in which incentive
constraints are re-expressed in terms of utility promises and these promises are used to
perturb future constraints via auxiliary "promise-keeping" conditions. The latter ensure
consistency of constraints and choices across periods.1 We show that the promise-keeping
formulation is applicable to many problems in which payoffs are separable over histories.
The approach can be used to recover the optimal payoff of a principal seeking to motivate
a population of uncommitted or privately informed agents or to recover the entire set of
equilibrium payoffs available to such a population. In the latter case, we use indicator
functions to represent equilibrium payoff sets, permitting a recasting of the set-theoretic
treatment of equilibrium payoffs in Abreu et al (1990) in terms of value functions.2 A
difﬁculty with the primal approach is that the associated value functions are very often
non-ﬁnite at some points in their domain, i.e. are extended real-valued. For example,
the indicator function representation assigns inﬁnite values to points outside of a payoff
set. From the point of view of practical computation extended real-valued functions are
1In some settings, for all feasible choices of a principal, agent choice problems are concave, smooth
and independent of other agents. Optimal agent choices are then completely characterized by ﬁrst order
conditions and agent shadow values can be used as state variables instead of promises. This can drastically
reduce the number of incentive constraints and the dimensionality of the state space. Such ﬁrst order
approaches are commonly used to solve Ramsey models recursively and have been used in some dynamic
private information settings. We do not pursue ﬁrst order approaches in this paper.
2The indicator function of X ⊆ RN is given by δX : RN → {0,∞} with δX(x) = 0 if x ∈ X and δX(x) = ∞
otherwise.
2awkward as they introduce arbitrarily large discontinuities or arbitrarily large steepness
at the boundaries of their effective domains, the regions upon which they are ﬁnite. This
has led some economists to ﬁrst approximate the effective domain (or "endogenous state
space") and then, in a second step, calculate the relevant value function.3 However, the
former approximation may not be straightforward, the domain may be complicated and
the value function may be discontinuous with respect to misspeciﬁcation of the domain.
Primal problems can be re-expressed using Lagrangians that incorporate some or all
constraints. In these re-expressed problems, a sup-inf operation over choices and La-
grange multipliers replaces a sup operation. The sequencing of sup and inf is important.
By interchanging them, a dual problem is obtained. Constraints absorbed into the dual
problem’s Lagrangian are said to be dualized. We show how by selectively dualizing
constraints from the recursive primal problem various recursive dual problems may be
recovered. In one the current promise-keeping constraint is dualized to give a formu-
lation close to Judd et al (2003). In another the current incentive and promise-keeping
constraints are dualized. This second dual problem is related to problems considered by
Marcet and Marimon (2011). We elaborate the relationship in Section 2 below.
The different formulations described above introduce duality gaps, differences be-
tween optimal primal and dual values. We discuss conditions for these to be zero and
show that they are weaker for the Judd et al (2003) formulation. In many cases, recursive
dual problems are formulated on state spaces of payoff weights. In these cases, updated
weights that perturb the objective encode rewards and penalties for adherence to and
violation of past incentive constraints.While the introduction of duality gaps (and the
additional assumptions required for their absence) is a disadvantage of recursive dual
approaches, the formulation of the problem on state spaces of weights can be useful.
Specifcally, it can avoid the non-ﬁnite value functions that emerge under the primal ap-
proach. Consider again the indicator function representation of an equilibrium payoff set.
If this set is closed and convex (and its indicator function lower semicontinuous and con-
vex), then it is represented on the space of weights by its support function.4 The indicator
function can be interpreted as a promise domain value function, the support function as
a weight domain one. Importantly, when the equilibrium set is bounded, the indicator
function is sometimes inﬁnite-valued, while the support function is everywhere ﬁnite.
Primal promise and dual weight domain value functions are tightly connected. Geo-
metrically, the latter gives the family of afﬁne functions minorized by the former. Analyt-
ically, modulo a sign change, the weight domain value function is the Legendre-Fenchel
3For example, see Abraham and Pavoni (2008).
4If X ⊆ RN, then σX : RN → R with σX(z) = supX z,x  is the support function.
3transform or conjugate of the promise domain function.5 Conversely, if (the negative of)
the promise domain value function is convex and lower semicontinuous, then it is the
conjugate of its weight domain counterpart. The recursive primal and recursive dual
formulations give rise to Bellman operators. We show that these are also related to one
another by conjugacy operations. Theorems may be more easily proven in one setting,
calculations more easily done in another. Our results makes precise the relations between
recursive formulations and the extent to which we can interchange and move between
them.
Our main interest in Bellman operators is as devices for recovering value functions. It
is standard in economics to consider problems in which the value function belongs to a
space of functions that is sup or, more generally, weight-norm bounded and in which the
Bellman operator is contractive on this space. In the context of dynamic incentive prob-
lems, it is often not possible or obvious to determine spaces of candidate value functions
on which the Bellman operator is contractive. In particular this is the case if the value
function is extended real-valued. However, we give conditions for the epiconvergence of
Bellman operator iterates to the value function in primal promise domain problems. Since
the Legendre-Fenchel operator and conjugation is continuous with respect to epiconver-
gence, our earlier results relating Bellman operators via conjugation ensure that, absent
duality gaps, certain dual Bellman iterations also converge to the true value function on a
weight domain. We brieﬂy also discuss when dual Bellman operators are contractive on
suitable function spaces.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides further discussion of the literature
and twomotivating examples. Section 3 laysout atwo period environment and giveseco-
nomic examples. The essential constraint structure common to many incentive problems
is isolated here. Sections 4 and 5 develop the key recursive approaches in a straightfor-
ward way in this two period setting. Section 6 describes a framework that accommodates
many inﬁnite-horizon problems and that incorporates the necessary constraint and objec-
tive structure. Sections 7 to 9 extend and apply the recursive formulations and duality re-
lations from earliersections to these problems. The additional consideration in the inﬁnite
horizon setting concerns the derivation of convergent value iteration procedures. This is
taken up in Section 10 where sufﬁcient conditions for epiconvergent promise and weight
domain primal value iteration are obtained. Some ﬁrst results on the contractivity of dual
Bellman operators and uniformly convergent value iteration are also provided. Section 11
brieﬂy discusses practical issues relating to the approximation of value functions. Proofs
are given in Appendix A, while Appendix B gives background duality results.
5If f : RN → R, then its Legendre-Fenchel transform or conjugate is f∗(y) = supx∈RN{ x,y  − f(x)}.
42 Literature
In this section, we review the literature and relate our contribution to others. Green (1987)
and Spear and Srivastava (1987) provide early applications of the primal promise ap-
proach to dynamic incentive problems. Abreu et al (1990) developed a related formula-
tion in the context of repeated games played by privately informed players. Further ap-
plications are provided by, inter alia, Fernandes and Phelan (2000), Kocherlakota (1996)
and Rustichini (1998). Judd et al (2003) implement a theoretical algorithm proposed by
Abreu et al (1990) for ﬁnding all of the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of an in-
ﬁnitely repeated game. Their implementation dualizes the promise-keeping conditions.
In an important and inﬂuential contribution, Marcet and Marimon (1999) (revised:
Marcet and Marimon (2011)) develop recursive saddle point methods for a class of dy-
namic contracting problems. Our approach is quite distinct from theirs. To understand
the distinction, let f : A → R, g : A → R and consider the following simple primal
problem:
P = sup
(a1,a2)∈A2
f(a1) + f(a2) s.t. g(a1) + g(a2) ≥ 0. (1)
Rewriting (1) in terms of a Lagrangian,
P = sup
(a1,a2)∈A2
inf
λ≥0
f(a1) + f(a2) + λ[g(a1) + g(a2)], (2)
and interchanging the sup and inf operations, the following dual problem is obtained:
D = inf
λ≥0
sup
(a1,a2)∈A2
f(a1) + f(a2) + λ[g(a1) + g(a2)]. (3)
In (3), we say that the constraint g(a1) + g(a2) ≥ 0 is dualized. (3) can be decomposed as:
D = inf
λ≥0
sup
a1∈A
f(a1) + λg(a1) + sup
a2∈A
{f(a2) + λg(a2)}. (4)
Thus, deﬁning P(λ) = supa2∈A {f(a2) + λg(a2)} and assuming conditions for a zero du-
ality gap, P = D, we obtain the recursive problem:
P = inf
λ≥0
sup
a1∈A
f(a1) + λg(a1) + P(λ). (5)
This combination of decomposition and duality is the essence of our approach. In the
remainder of the paper, we present reﬁnements and extensions of it. With respect to
5reﬁnements, the constraint g(a1)+g(a2) ≥ 0 maybebroken down into: {(a1,a2) : g(a1)+
w ≥ 0, g(a2) = w} and each piece dualized separately. Dualization of only the g(a2) =
w component is done by Judd et al (2003) and, in itself, delivers a key computational
advantage. The central extension is to inﬁnite horizon problems with many constraints.
There one has many choices about what to dualize. We proceed by dualizing (subsets
of) current constraints rather than all constraints. This avoids technical complications by
keeping the dual space which houses Lagrange multipliers ﬁnite dimensional.
Now Marcet and Marimon (2011) pursue a different approach. They consider the
saddle point problem:
maxmin
(a1,a2;λ)∈A2×R+
f(a1) + f(a2) + λ[g(a1) + g(a2)], (6)
where maxmin is the saddle value operation, i.e. maxmin
(x,y)∈X×Y
h(x,y) = h(x∗,y∗) with x∗ ∈
argmaxX h(x,y∗) and y∗ ∈ argminY h(x∗,y). They relate this to:
maxmin
(a1;λ)∈A×R+
f(a1) + λg(a1) + max
a2∈A
{f(a2) + λg(a2)}. (7)
Note that in (6), the minimization over λ is done holding both a1 and a2 constant, whereas
in (7) only a1 is held constant. Decomposition of our inf
λ
sup
a
operation is more direct and
straightforward than decomposition of the maxmin
(a,λ)
operation. It is also possible under
weakerassumptions. On theotherhand, insomesituations the recursive saddleapproach
can give more reﬁned results, see the discussion of policies below.
There are several other differences between Marcet and Marimon (2011) and the cur-
rent paper. First, there are differences between the sets of incentive problems considered
in each paper. Marcet and Marimon explicitly incorporate physical state variables such
as capital, we do not. On the other hand, they exclude problems with private information
and focus on ones with a committed principal or government. We extend both of these
elements. Second, Marcet and Marimon (2011) construct Lagrangians that include in-
centive constraints (and, implicitly, the law of motion for promises), but exclude the law
of motion for physical state variables. As a result, their recursive formulation features
a mixture of primal and dual constraints and primal and dual state variables. We keep
all laws of motion in either primal or dual form. Thus, we use either primal (promise) or
dual (multiplier) state variables, but never a mixture.6 Third, we spell out the connections
6A further differencebetween us and Marcetand Marimon’s original contribution, Marcetand Marimon
(1999), is that in this they incorporate incentive constraints from all periods into the Lagrangian and seek
a recursive formulation of the resulting problem. This necessitates an explicit treatment of the inﬁnite
6between the recursive primal problem and a family of recursive dual problems. Finally,
we relax the boundedness conditions necessary for convergent value iteration.
Messner et al (2011) develop recursive primal and dual methods in abstract two and
multi-period settings. They consider general separable constraint structures that can ac-
commodate resource or incentive constraints or combinations of both. They associate
constraints with periods and derive a recursive primal formulation in which state vari-
ables have physical interpretations (e.g. as capital) or accounting interpretations (e.g. as
promises) depending upon the setting. They dualize all constraints across all periods and
then seek a recursive formulation. We reverse this, ﬁrst ﬁnding a primal recursive formu-
lation and then dualizing current constraints to obtain new recursive problems. Messner
et al (2011) show that primal and recursive dual values are equal if there is a saddle point
in the original non-recursive problem, rather than a saddle point after every history. They
also consider alternative forms of constraint separability. In contrast to the current paper,
they do not focus on inﬁnite horizon problems.
The focus of this paper is on values rather than policies. We invoke assumptions
that ensure a zero duality gap between primal and dual problems. Sleet and Yeltekin
(2010a) show that if the assumptions are strengthened to ensure strong duality (i.e. a
zero duality gap and the existence of a minimizing multiplier), then any solution to the
original primal problem attains the suprema in the corresponding recursive dual prob-
lem. For example, if (a∗
1,a∗
2) solves (1), P = D and λ∗ attains the minimum in (5), then
P = f(a∗
1) + λ∗g(a∗
1) + P(λ∗) and P(λ∗) = f(a∗
2) + λ∗g(a∗
2). However, as pointed out by
Messner and Pavoni (2004), the converse does not hold: strong duality does not guaran-
tee that recursive dual maximizers solve the primal problem. Thus, even if P = D, λ∗ is
minimizing, and for each i, ai ∈ argmaxA f(a) + λ∗g(a), (a1,a2) may not solve (1). The
recursive saddle approach of Marcet and Marimon (2011)can reﬁne the set of maximizing
policies obtained by the recursive dual approach. However, it may still admit maximizers
that do not solve the primal problem, see Messner et al (2011). A sufﬁcient condition for
either approach to yield a primal solution, if one exists, is uniqueness of the maximizers
in the recursive dual, see, for example, Sleet and Yeltekin (2010a) or Messner et al (2011).
In recent work Marimon et al (2011) and Cole and Kubler (2010) extend recursive dual/
saddle point methods to permit recovery of optimal solutions in settings when recursive
dual maximizers are not unique.
dimensional dual space. Our sequential dualization procedure avoids this.
73 A two period framework
In the next few sections, we pursue our main ideas in an abstract, but simple two period
setting. This allows us to highlight their generality and to avoid cluttering the exposi-
tion with the more detailed notation needed for inﬁnite horizon applications. The two
period problem we consider incorporates a constraint structure common to many dy-
namic incentive problems. We illustrate this with examples. We then derive recursive
decompositions of this problem by selectively dualizing intertemporal constraints. These
decompositions deﬁne Bellman operators that have direct application to inﬁnite horizon
settings. Indeed our two period formulation may be interpreted as a decomposition of an
inﬁnite horizon problem into its ﬁrst and subsequent periods.
3.1 A two period primal problem
Assume an event tree Z(0) with a ﬁrst period node 0 and a set of second period successor
nodes K = {1,    ,K}. The nodes in K are identiﬁed with the aftermath of distinct
shocks also indexed by K. A choice ak ∈ Ak is made at each node. Let a = {ak}K
k=0 denote
a proﬁle of choices and A = ∏
K
k=0 Ak the set of such proﬁles. The component sets Ak are
not further speciﬁed. In applications additional mathematical (and economic) structure
is placed upon them, but for the general formulation of the problem in this section such
structure is not needed.7 Economic applications and interpretations are provided below.
Let f : A → R denote an objective function. f is assumed to be additively separable
in the components {ak}:
f(a) =
K
∑
k=0
fk(ak)q0
k, (8)
with fk : Ak → R and q0 = {q0
k} ∈ RK+1
+ afamilyofnon-negative weights. Inapplications
the weights {q0
k} will incorporate discounting and probabilistic weighting of nodes.
We consider the maximization of the objective (8) subject to a separable constraint
structure that is common to many incentive problems. This structure is illustrated in
Figure 1. M ﬁrst period constraints are applied to the entire tree. Anticipating later ap-
plications we call them incentive constraints. These constraints are indexed by m ∈ M,
where the index set has cardinality M. For example, in hidden information applications
constraints are naturally indexed by pairs of shocks (the true shock and a lie). The m-
th constraint is constructed from functions gm
0 : A0 → R and gk,n : Ak → R, k ∈ K,
7Ak is most often a subset of Rpk. Node speciﬁc choices are often identiﬁed with allocations of consump-
tion, effort or lotteries over these things.
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∑
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∑
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(a) Period 1: gm
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Figure 1: Common Constraint Structure
n ∈ {1,    , N} and weights qm = {qm
k,n} ∈ RKN according to:
gm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
gk,n(ak)qm
k,n ≥ 0. (9)
The function gm
0 and weights qm are allowed to be constraint speciﬁc. However, the func-
tions gk,n are common to all constraints (and, therefore, have no constraint superscript).
There are K further constraints that are node-speciﬁc. Each describes a restriction on a
second period shock-contingent choice that is independent of past choices and of other
second period shock-contingent choices. Inapplications, these will describe incentive and
other constraints appliedafterthe ﬁrst period. For each k ∈ K, letYk be apartiallyordered
vector space with zero element 0k and let gM+k
k : Ak → Yk. The additional node-speciﬁc
constraints are given by:
∀k ∈ K, gM+k
k (ak) ≥ 0k. (10)
The constraint structure in (9)and (10)identiﬁesconstraints with nodesand constructs
them from functions that are additively separable across histories. In addition, the M ﬁrst
period constraint functions map each future node choice ak to {gk,n(ak)}N
n=1 ∈ RN. The
latter variables summarize the impact of ak on each of the ﬁrst M constraints and do so
economically if Ak is of higher dimension than N. A further reduction in the dimension
of the summary variables occurs if all of the weights qm
k,n are multiplicatively separable as
9qm
k,n = qm
k qk,n since then (9) becomes:
gm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
qm
k
N
∑
n=1
gk,n(ak)qk,n ≥ 0, (11)
and ∑
N
n=1 gk,n(ak)qk,n summarizes the impact of ak in the ﬁrst M constraints. These fea-
tures of the constraint structure are essential for the recursive decompositions that follow.
To ensure a non-trivial problem, the constraint set is assumed to be non-empty:
Ω1 =
 
a ∈ A
 
 
   
 
∀m ∈ M, gm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
gk,n(ak)qm
k,n ≥ 0 and ∀k ∈ K, gM+k
k (ak) ≥ 0
 
 = ∅,
and the objective ∑
K
k=0 fk(ak)q0
k is assumed to be bounded above on this set. The sequential
primal problem is then:
P = sup
Ω1
K
∑
k=0
fk(ak)q0
k (SP)
with P ﬁnite.
3.2 A ﬁrst motivating example
This example is based on Atkeson and Lucas (1992). Suppose there are two periods. An
agent receives privately observed taste shocks {θt}2
t=1. These are described by a probabil-
ity space (Θ × Θ,G,P), where for simplicity Θ = {  θk}K
k=1 is ﬁnite and K = {1,    ,K}.
The shocks perturb the agent’s utility from consumption {ct}2
t=1:8
2
∑
t=1
βt−1∑
θt
θtv(ct(θt))P(θt). (12)
In eq. (12), β ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor, v : R+ → D ⊆ R is a per period utility. v is
assumed increasing, concave and continuous with inverse C = D → R+.
Aplannerseeksto insure the agentagainst differenttaste shock realizations. Shemust,
however, induce the agent to truthfully report them. Her objective incorporates both the
agent’s utility and the cost of resources evaluated at (shadow) prices {Qt}. She solves:
sup
2
∑
t=1
βt−1∑
θt
 
θtv(ct(θt)) − Qtct(θt)
 
P(θt) (13)
8The model is easily extended to one with multiple goods. By labeling one of these goods leisure, it
accommodates a Mirrleesian model.
10subject to for all t, θt, ct(θt) ≥ 0, and the incentive constraints, for all m ∈ M := {(m1,m2) ∈
K2,m1  = m2},
  θm1v(c1(  θm1)) + β
K
∑
l=1
  θlv(c2(  θm1,   θl))P(  θl|  θm1) (14)
≥   θm1v(c1(  θm2)) + β
K
∑
l=1
  θlv(c2(  θm2,   θl))P(  θl|  θm1),
and for all k ∈ K and m ∈ M,   θm1v(c2(  θk,   θm1)) ≥   θm1v(c2(  θk,   θm2)). Notice that the
incentive constraints are indexed by pairs of shock indices m = (m1,m2), where m1 is the
true state and m2 an alternative state that the agent must be deterred from reporting.
This example can easily be re-expressed along the lines of the abstract two period
problem. Let gm
0 (c1) =   θm1u(c1(  θm1)) −   θm1u(c1(  θm2)) and gk,l(c) = u(c). Set the weights
{qm
k,l} according to: qm
k,l = βP(  θl|  θm1) if k = m1 (the "true shock"), qm
k,l = −βP(  θl|  θm1)
if k = m2 (the "lie") and qm
k,l = 0 otherwise. The ﬁrst period constraints may then be
re-expressed as:
gm
0 (c1) +
K
∑
k=1
K
∑
l=1
gk,l(c2(  θk,   θl))qm
k,l ≥ 0. (15)
The second period incentive constraints may be summarized as:
gM+k
k (c2(  θk, )) = {  θm1v(c2(  θk,   θm1)) −   θm1v(c2(  θk,   θm2))}m∈M ≥ 0. (16)
In this example, the future node choice ak is identiﬁed with {c2(  θk, )} ∈ RK
+ and the
summary variables with {gk,l(c2(  θk,   θl))}l∈K ∈ RK The latter offer no reduction in dimen-
sion. However, in problems with simpler shock structures (that require lower dimension
summary variables) and/or longer time horizons (that involve higher dimension future
choices), the summary variables will offer such a reduction. For example, suppose that
taste shocks are i.i.d. with per period probability distribution P. In this case, the weights
are multiplicatively separable, qm
k,l = βqm
k P(  θl), with qm
k = 1 if k = m1 (k indexes the true
shock), qm
k = −1 if k = m2 (k indexes the lie) and qm
k = 0 otherwise. Then, (15) reduces to:
gm
0 (c1) +
K
∑
k=1
qm
k
K
∑
l=1
gk,l(c2(  θk,   θl))P(  θl) ≥ 0, (17)
and all constraints map the k-th subtree to the summary variable ∑
K
l=1 gk,l(c2(  θk,   θl))P(  θl).
Problem (13) may be embedded into a family of constraint or objective-perturbed
problems. The former augment the constraint set with "promise-keeping" constraints of
11the form:
wk =   θkv(c1(  θk)) + β
K
∑
l=1
  θlv(c2(  θk,   θl))P(  θl|  θk),
for some w ∈ RK and each k ∈ K. Letting Ω1(w) denote the augmented, promise-
perturbed constraint set, the promise-perturbed problem is:
S(w) =



supΩ1(w) ∑
2
t=1 βt−1 ∑θt
 
θtv(ct(θt)) − Qtct(θt)
 
Pt(θt) Ω1(w)  = ∅.
−∞ otherwise
(18)
Asshown below, this problem hasrecursive primal and dual formulations that exploit the
previously described constraint structure and that use utility promises as state variables.
The objective-perturbed problem attaches a weighted sum of utilities to the objective:
V(ζ) = sup
Ω1
2
∑
t=1
βt−1∑
θt
 
θtv(ct(θt)) − Qtct(θt)
 
Pt(θt) (19)
+
K
∑
k=1
ζk
 
  θkv(c1(  θk)) + β
K
∑
l=1
  θlv(c2(  θk,   θl))P(  θl|  θk)
 
.
In (19), Ω1 is the original (unperturbed) constraint set. This problem has recursive formu-
lations that use weights ζ ∈ RK as state variables.
3.3 A second motivating example
In our next example, based upon Kocherlakota (1996), the goal is to characterize the
incentive-feasible risk sharing arrangements of a group of agents I = {1,..., I} who
receive shocks to their endowments of goods and their outside utility options. No agent
can be compelled to accept a utility below her outside option.
Again there are two periods, t = 1,2. The publicly observable endowment shock
θt ∈ Θ := {  θk}k∈K determines the aggregate resources available to agents in each period:
I
∑
i=1
ci
t(θt) ≤ Y(θt), Y : Θ → R+, (20)
where ci
t is the consumption of agent i at t. Agent i values consumption according to:
2
∑
t=1
βt−1∑
θt
v(ci
t(θt))P(θt)
12and has a date and state-contingent outside utility option: Vi
t : Θ → R, t = 1,2. A
consumption process c = {ci
t} is incentive-feasible if it satisﬁes (20) and gives each agent
m1 more than their outside option in each ﬁrst period shock state m2:
u(c
m1
1 (  θm2)) + β
K
∑
l=1
u(c
m1
2 (  θm2,   θl))P(  θl|  θm2) ≥ V
m1
1 (  θm2), (21)
and each second period shock state m2:
u(c
m1
2 (  θk,   θm2)) ≥ V
m1
2 (  θm2). (22)
It is readily seen that these incentive constraints have the same basic structure as in
the last example. Indexing constraints by agent and shock, m = (m1,m2) ∈ I × K, the
ﬁrst period constraints (21) apply to the entire associated event tree Z(0). They may be
re-expressed as in (15) where now gm
0 (c1) = um1(c1(  θm2)) − V
m1
1 (  θm2), gk,l(c) = u(c) and
qm
k,l = qm
k βP(  θl|  θk) with qm
k = 1 if k = m2 (k indexes the actual shock received by the m1
agent) and 0 otherwise. The second period incentive constraints (22) are summarized as:
gM+k
k ({c2(  θk, )}) = {um1(c2(  θk,   θm2)) − V
m1
2 (  θm2)}m∈M ≥ 0. (23)
The set of incentive-feasible payoffs is given by:
V0 =
 
w ∈ RI
 
 
 
   
∃ an incentive-feasible c s.t. ∀i, wi =
2
∑
t=1
βt−1∑
θt
v(ci
t(θt))P(θt)
 
.
The problem of ﬁnding V0 may be formulated as a constraint-perturbed planning prob-
lem. Let Ω1(w) denote the set of incentive-feasible consumption processes that deliver
the utility w and let f(θ,c) := 0. Deﬁne the planning problem:
S(w) =



supΩ1(w) ∑
2
t=1 βt−1 ∑θt f(θt,ct(θt))P(θt) if Ω1(w)  = ∅,
−∞ otherwise.
(24)
Then S(w) = 0 if w ∈ V0 and −∞ otherwise. Thus −S is simply the indicator function for
the set V0.9 Contrasting (24) with (18) reveals the parallel between this example and the
last. Moreover, as for the last example, (24) leads to recursive primal and dual problems
formulated in terms of utility promises. These problems now involve indicator functions
for incentive-feasible payoff and continuation incentive-feasible payoff sets. As an alter-
9The indicator function of X ⊆ RK is given by δX : X → R, where δX(x) = 0 if x ∈ X and ∞ otherwise.
13native, the following objective-perturbed problem may be formulated:
V(ζ) = sup
Ω1
2
∑
t=1
βt−1∑
θt
f(θt,ct(θt))P(θt)
+
K
∑
k=1
ζk
 
v(c1(  θk)) + β
K
∑
l=1
v(c2(  θk,   θl))P(  θl|  θk)
 
= sup
Ω1
K
∑
k=1
ζk
 
v(c1(  θk)) + β
K
∑
l=1
v(c2(  θk,   θl))P(  θl|  θk)
 
. (25)
In this case, V is the support function of V0.10 Recursive problems are available for (25).
Theseuseutilityweightsasastate variableandinvolvethesupport functionsofincentive-
feasible and continuation incentive-feasible payoff sets.
4 A quartet of recursive decompositions
A recursive formulation of the primal problem (SP) is obtained by introducing supple-
mentary promise-keeping constraints. These are redundant from the point of view of
the original problem, but enforce prior constraints in the recursive formulation. Primal
optimizations may be expressed as sup-inf problems using Lagrangians. Our subsequent
decompositions are obtainedbyselectivelyinterchanging sup andinfoperations toobtain
decomposable dual problems. Since there are multiple constraints, there are multiple op-
portunities for such interchange leading to different decompositions. We focus on three.
Their connections to our ﬁrst primal decomposition are summarized in Figure 2.
Primal decomposition Second decomposition
Fourth decomposition Third decomposition
Partly dualize promise-keeping
Dualize incentive
constraints Dualize recursive
incentive constraints
Dualize promise-keeping
Fully dualize promise
keeping and recursive
incentive constraints
Figure 2: Relations between decompositions
10The support function of X ⊆ RK is given by σX : RK → R, where σX(d) = supx∈X x,d .
144.1 First decomposition: a primal formulation with promises as states
A recursive decomposition of (SP) is obtained as follows. First deﬁne the promise variables:
wk = {wk,n}n∈N, wk,n := gk,n(ak), k ∈ K,n ∈ N
and decompose the constraints (9) into a collection of recursive incentive constraints and
promise-keeping constraints:
∀m ∈ M, gm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K,n ∈ N, wk,n = gk,n(ak). (26)
(SP) may then be rewritten as:
P = sup
  Ω1
K
∑
k=0
fk(ak)q0
k, (27)
where
  Ω1 =

  
  
(a,w) ∈ A × RKN
   
 
 
   
 
 
∀m, gm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n ≥ 0,
∀k,n,wk,n = gk,n(ak), ∀k, gM+k
k (ak) ≥ 0

  
  
.
Next, deﬁne the continuation problems, for all k ∈ K,
Sk(wk) =



sup fk(ak) Φk(wk)  = ∅
−∞ otherwise,
(28)
where:
Φk(wk) =
 
ak ∈ Ak
 
   ∀n ∈ N,wk,n = gk,n(ak), gM+k
k (ak) ≥ 0
 
.
A routine application of the principal of optimality yields the following decomposition.
Proposition 1 (Primal Decomposition). The primal value P satisﬁes:
P = sup
Ψ0
f0(a0)q0
0 +
K
∑
k=1
Sk(wk)q0
k, (29)
where: Ψ0 =
 
(a0,w) ∈ A0 × RKN
 
 
 ∀m ∈ M, gm
0 (a0) + ∑
K
k=1 ∑
N
n=1wk,nqm
k,n ≥ 0
 
.
Proof. See Appendix A.  
15The preceding decomposition relies on the association of the ﬁrst group of incentive
constraints with the initial period; the promises w then act as forward state variables. They
enforce the initial incentive constraints by compelling constraint-consistent ﬁrst and sec-
ond period choices. The label "forward" stems from the fact that promises are deﬁned as
functions of future second period choices.11
In general, not all promise valuesensure feasible problems forthe second period. Con-
sequently, the functions Sk may be −∞-valued over some subset of their domains. The
effective domain of a function f : X → R is the set upon which it is ﬁnite, i.e. Dom
f := {x ∈ X|f(x) ∈ R}. In the context of dynamic incentive problems, the sets Dom Sk
are often referred to as endogenous state spaces. Numerical implementation of the primal
decomposition is complicated by lack of knowledge of these sets and by their computa-
tional representation.
4.2 Second decomposition: weights as states and the dualization of the
promise-keeping constraint
Our second decomposition uses an alternative representation of the second period value
function and an alternative state space. It is obtained via the partial dualization of the
promise-keeping constraints in the preceding primal decomposition.
Returning to (27), the primal problem may be re-expressed in terms of a Lagrangian
that incorporates the promise-keeping constraints:
P = sup
  ΩPK
1
inf
RKN
K
∑
k=0
fk(ak)q0
k +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
zk,n[gk,n(ak) − wk,n],
where z ∈ RKN is the multiplier on the promise-keeping constraints and   ΩPK
1 omits these
constraints from   Ω1. Rearrangement gives:
P = sup
Ψ0
f0(a0)q0
0 +
K
∑
k=1
sup
{Ak:gM+k
k (ak)≥0}
inf
RN
 
fk(ak) +
N
∑
n=1
zk,n[gk,n(ak) − wk,n]
 
qk
0. (30)
Equivalently, (30) re-expresses the continuation problems in (29) in sup-inf form. Now
consider partially dualizing the promise-keeping constraints in (30) by interchanging the
11In contrast to "backward" state variables which are deﬁned as functions of past ﬁrst period ones.
16sup and inf operations over ak and zk (but not over (a0,w) ∈ Ψ0 and z). Deﬁning:
Vk(zk) = sup
{Ak:gM+k(ak)≥0}
fk(ak) +
K
∑
n=1
zk,ngk,n(ak), (31)
we obtain the dual problem:
DPK = sup
Ψ0
inf
RKN
f0(a0)q0
0 +
K
∑
k=1
 
Vk(zk) −
K
∑
n=1
zk,nwk,n
 
qk
0. (32)
Problem (32)is recursive, but it replaces the promise state variable w with the weight state
variable z. In the continuation problem (31), the objective fk is perturbed by the weighted
sum ∑
K
n=1 zk,ngk,n(ak). In the sequel we refer to such problems as "objective-perturbed". If
for each k and all wk ∈ RN,
Sk(wk) = inf
RN
 
Vk(zk) −
K
∑
n=1
zk,nwk,n
 
, (33)
then P = DPK and (32) permits the recovery of the optimal primal value. Condition (33)
corresponds to the absence of a duality gap in all continuation problems. We consider
this absence and the equivalence of (30) and (32) below. Before doing so, we introduce
the concept of a conjugate function and recast the discussion in terms of such functions.
4.2.1 Conjugate functions
The conjugate of f : RN → R is given by f∗ : RN → R, where
f∗(x∗) = sup
x∈RN
{ x, x∗  − f(x)} ,
and   ,   : RN × RN → R denotes the usual dot product operation. Geometrically, f∗
describes the family of afﬁne functions majorized by f. The conjugate of f∗ (i.e. the con-
jugate of the conjugate) is referred to as the biconjugate of f and is denoted f∗∗. Let FN
0
denote the set of proper functions f : RN → R that are nowhere −∞ and are somewhere
less than ∞ and let FN denote the set of proper, lower semicontinuous and convex func-
tions. A well known result12 asserts that if f ∈ FN
0 , then f∗ ∈ FN and f∗∗ is the lower
semicontinuous and convex regularization of f. The Legendre-Fenchel transform maps a
function to its conjugate and is denoted C. It follows that C : FN
0 → FN and C is a self-
12See Rockafellar (1970), p. 103-104.
17inverse on FN.
With minor qualiﬁcations on the boundaries of effective domains, differentiability du-
alizes under C to strict convexity. If f ∈ FN is differentiable on the interior of Dom f,
then f∗ is strictly convex on the relative interior of Dom f∗ and vice versa. There is also
an attractive conjugacy between Dom f and Dom f∗ which we elaborate below. Finally,
conjugacy provides a convenient framework for expressing duality relations between op-
timization problems. This is elaborated in Appendix B.
4.2.2 Relating the decompositions
Suppose that each value function Vk : RN → R is ﬁnite at 0 in which case −Sk ∈ FN
0 .13
It is an immediate consequence of Proposition B0 in the appendix, that Vk = C[−Sk] and
that it is in FN, i.e. is proper, convex and lower semicontinuous. However, except at 0
by assumption, Vk may be ∞-valued over some part of its domain. If −Sk ∈ FN as well,
then −Sk = C[Vk]. In this case, Sk and Vk provide alternative representations of the upper
surface of the k-th continuation incentive-feasible payoff set. The geometric implications
of these relations are illustrated below in Figure 3 (for the case N = 1).
(z,1)
Vk(z)
w
Sk(w)
w
s
Sk
(a) Vk = C(−Sk)
Vk(z)
z
−Sk(w)
z
v
(−w,1)
Vk
(b) −Sk = C(Vk)
Figure 3: Conjugacy between value functions
Since:
C[Vk] = inf
RN
 
Vk(zk) −
K
∑
n=1
zk,nwk,n
 
,
the preceding discussion implies the absence of a duality gap in the continuation problem
when −Sk ∈ FN and, hence, the following result.
13If Vk(0) is ﬁnite, Sk cannot be ∞ anywhere. Since Ω1 is non-empty, Sk is more than −∞ somewhere.
18Proposition 2. Assume that each −Sk ∈ FN, then:
P = sup
Ψ0
inf
RKN
f0(a0)q0
0 +
K
∑
k=1
 
Vk(zk) −
N
∑
n=1
wk,nzk,n
 
q0
k. (34)
In Section 4.1, we emphasized that the potential inﬁnite-valuedness of the functions
{−Sk} creates difﬁculties for the primal decomposition. Similar concerns potentially ap-
ply to the second decomposition (34) and the value functions Vk. However, the effective
domains of Vk and Sk are related by conjugacy arguments. This relation is described in
Proposition 3 and leads to the identiﬁcation of an important case in which the functions
Vk are ﬁnite-valued.
Recall again that the support function of a set X ⊆ RN is given by σX(d) = supX x,d .
Also note the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1. If f ∈ FN, then its asymptotic function f ∞ : RN → R is given by: f ∞(y) =
limλ→∞
f(x+λy)−f(x)
λ for any x ∈ RN.
Proposition 3. Let −Sk ∈ FN. The support function of Dom (−Sk) equals the asymptotic
function of Vk and vice versa.
Proof. Follows from the previous discussion and Rockafellar (1970), p. 116.  
The following corollary is of particular use. Recall that the epigraph of a function
f : RN → R, epi f, is given by epi f = {(x,r) ∈ RN+1|f(x) ≤ r}.
Corollary1. Assumethat −Sk ∈ FN and epi(−Sk) contains nononverticalhalflines, thenDom
Vk = RN. In particular, if fk is bounded above and each gk,n is bounded, then Dom Vk = RN.
It follows that when gk,n represents the bounded continuation utility of an agent and
the objective is bounded above, then the effective domain ("endogenous state space") of
the objective-perturbed value function Vk is immediatelygiven asall of RN. Boundedness
above of the objective is quite common. It occurs in most applications with a committed
principal and in applications in which a value set is encoded as an indicator function.14
For comparison with the results from later decompositions it is useful to recast (32) us-
ing a Lagrangian that incorporates the ﬁrst period incentive constraints. Letting η denote
14Every point x in RN can be identiﬁed with a point on the unit hemisphere Hn = {(γ,λ) ∈ RN ×R|λ >
0, γ 2 + λ2 = 1} in RN+1 by the mappings γ(x) = x/( x 2 + 1) and λ(x) = 1/( x 2 + 1). Thus, in this
case, the effective domain can alternatively be identiﬁed with this set.
19the multiplier on these constraints, we obtain:
DPK = sup
A0×RKN
inf
RM
+ ×RKN
f0(a0)q0
0 +
M
∑
m=1
ηmgm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
 
V(zk) +
N
∑
n=1
[ζk,n(η) − zk,n]wk,n
 
q0
k,
(35)
where: ζk,n(η) := ∑
M
m=1 ηm
qm
k,n
q0
k
, ∀k ∈ K,n ∈ N.
4.3 Third decomposition: promises as states and the dualization of the
incentive constraints
We return to (27) and instead of (partially) dualizing the promise-keeping constraints, we
dualize the recursive incentive constraints. Using a Lagrangian that incorporates these
constraints, (27) may be re-expressed as:
P = sup
  ΩIC
1
inf
RM
+
K
∑
k=0
fk(ak)q0
k +
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0)qm
0 +
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n
 
, (36)
where   ΩIC
1 omits the recursive incentive constraints from   Ω1 and η ∈ RM
+ is the multiplier
upon them. Interchanging the sup and inf operations gives the dual problem:
DIC = inf
RM
+
sup
  ΩIC
1
K
∑
k=0
fk(ak)q0
k +
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0)qm
0 +
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n
 
. (37)
Breaking apart the inner supremum optimization and substituting for Sk gives our next
decomposition.
Proposition 4. The dual value DIC satisﬁes the following condition:
DIC = inf
RM
+
sup
A0×RKN
f0(a0)q0
0 +
M
∑
m=1
ηmgm
0 (a0)qm
0 +
K
∑
k=1
 
M
∑
m=1
ηm
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n + Sk(wk)q0
k
 
.
(38)
As for the ﬁrst decomposition, (38) uses promises as state variables and employs the
constraint-perturbed value functions Sk.
Problem (38) permits the recovery of the optimal primal value if there is no duality
gap between (36) and (37). This absence can be expressed in terms of the conjugacy of
value functions, but now these functions involve perturbations of ﬁrst period incentive
20constraints. Speciﬁcally, (SP) may be embedded into the family of incentive-perturbed
problems:
P(δ) := sup
a∈Ω1(δ)
K
∑
k=0
fk(ak)q0
k, (39)
where
Ω1(δ) =
 
a ∈ A
   
 
 
 
each gm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
gk,n(ak)qm
k,n ≥ −δ and each gM+k
k (ak) ≥ 0
 
.
P( ) is the value function associated with perturbations of the ﬁrst period incentive con-
straints. Evidently, the optimal primal value from (SP) equals P(0). By Theorem B1 in
the appendix, after the elimination of the promises,15 −DIC = C2[−P( )](0) and a zero
duality gap occurs if −P( ) ∈ FM.
4.4 A fourth decomposition: weights as states and the dualization of
the incentive constraints
Our ﬁnal decomposition uses weightsasstate variablesand the objective-perturbed value
function. It is obtained by dualizing the recursive incentive and promise-keeping con-
straints . Problem (27) may be re-expressed as:
P = sup
  ΩPKIC
1
inf
RM
+ ×RKN
K
∑
k=0
fk(ak)q0
k +
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0)qm
0 +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n
 
+
K
∑
k=1
q0
k
N
∑
n=1
zk,n[gk,n(ak) − wk,n], (40)
where η and z are the multipliers on the recursive incentive and promise-keeping con-
straints and both are omitted from   ΩPKIC
1 . The associated dual is:
DPKIC = inf
RM
+ ×RKN
sup
  ΩPKIC
1
K
∑
k=0
fk(ak)q0
k +
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0)qm
0 +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n
 
+
K
∑
k=1
q0
k
N
∑
n=1
zk,n[gk,n(ak) − wk,n]. (41)
15The promises and the promise-keeping constraints deliver the recursive formulation which is not used
in establishing conditions for a zero duality gap.
21Rearrangement of the supremum component gives:
DPKIC = inf
RM
+ ×RKN
sup
A0
 
f0(a0)q0
0 +
M
∑
m=1
gm
0 (a0)qm
0
 
+
K
∑
k=1
sup
{Ak:gM+k(ak)≥0}
 
fk(ak) +
N
∑
n=1
zk,ngk,n(ak)
 
q0
k
+ sup
RKN
K
∑
k=1
q0
k
N
∑
n=1
wk,n
 
M
∑
m=1
ηm
qm
k,n
q0
k
− zk,n
 
. (42)
Substituting for Vk and using the earlier deﬁnition of ζk,n, (42) reduces to:
DPKIC = inf
RM
+ ×RKN
sup
A0×RKN
f0(a0)q0
0 +
M
∑
m=1
ηmgm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
 
V(zk) +
N
∑
n=1
[ζk,n(η) − zk,n]wk,n
 
q0
k.
(43)
In (42), the sup value is ∞ unless each zk,n is chosen to equal ∑
M
m=1 ηm
qm
k,n
q0
k
. Substituting
these values into (42) and using the deﬁnition of Vk implies the following result.
Proposition 5. The dual value DPKIC satisﬁes:
DPKIC = inf
RM
+
sup
A0
f0(a0)q0
0 +
M
∑
m=1
ηmgm
0 (a0)qm
0 +
K
∑
k=1
Vk(ζk(η))q0
k, (44)
where ζ(η) = {ζk(η)}k =
 
∑
M
m=1 ηm
qm
k,n
q0
k
 
k,n
∈ RKN.
In this context, ζ(η) ∈ RKN may be interpreted as a backwards state variable for the dual
problem. It penalizes ﬁrst period constraint violations via perturbations of the continu-
ation objective. The label "backward" stems from the fact that ζ is a function of the ﬁrst
period choice η.
Remark1. Ifeach A0 = RP and the current constraint functions gm
0 are afﬁne, i.e., {gm
0 (a0)}
= b0 + B1a0, with B1 an M × P matrix, then the value function from the inner supremum
operation equals f∗
0(h′B1), where h′ = (η1q0
1/q0
0 ...ηMq0
M/q0
0). Afﬁne constraint functions
are quite common in applications in which the action variables a0 are identiﬁed with
agent utilities. If A0 = RP and f0 is additively separable, then the inner supremum is
itself decomposable and each component of a0 can be solved for separately. If both of the
preceding assumptions hold and f0 is an additive sum of standard functional forms, e.g.
polynomial or exponential, then the conjugate f∗
0 is often immediately available and no
maximization needsto bedone explicitly. Again, thisisoften the case inappliedeconomic
problems.
22The decomposition (44) is readily related to the preceding three. Relative to the sec-
ond, it dualizes the incentive and fully dualizes the promise-keeping constraint (compare
(43) to (35)). Relative to the third, it dualizes the promise-keeping constraint. However, it
is straightforward to check that in the latter case, this additional dualization does not in-
troduce a duality gap and that DPKIC = DIC. In addition, if P = DIC, then P = DPKIC and
so conditions for the absence of a duality gap between the primal and the third decompo-
sition ensure the absence of such a gap between the primal and the fourth decomposition.
4.5 Value function properties
We have seen that duality gaps are absent and the various decompositions give the same
optimal value when the value functions obtained by perturbing "intertemporal" con-
straints are proper, lower semicontinuous and convex. In this case these functions and
their conjugates give alternative, but equivalent representations of a relevant payoff sur-
face. We are thus led to consider when value functions inherit properness, lower semicon-
tinuity and convexity from the primitives of a problem. This issue is taken up in general
terms in Appendix B. Here we relate the results from Appendix B to the present setting.
Properness is a mild condition. We have previously assumed that Ω1 is non-empty. This
ensures the constraint sets for the continuation promise-perturbed problems (31) and the
incentive-perturbed problem (39) are non-empty for some parameters. Provided the ob-
jective functions in these problems are bounded above on all constraint sets, properness
of the relevant primal value functions is obtained. A well known condition for convexity
of −Sk or −P( ) is thatthe constraint correspondences Φk and Ω1 have convex graphsand
the problem objectives are concave. For the continuation problems (31), this requires that
the functions gk,n, gM+k
k and fk are, respectively, afﬁne, quasiconcave and concave. For
the problems (39), concavity of gm
0 , gk,n( )qm
k,n and fk along with quasiconcavity of gM+k
k
is needed. Some dynamic incentive problems satisfy these conditions, see for example
Atkeson and Lucas (1992) or Kocherlakota (1996). Others such as Thomas and Worrall
(1990) do not, but, instead satisfy weaker conditions that are sufﬁcient for convexity of
the value function. The following example and Appendix B provide further discussion.
The latter also provides discussion of conditions for lower semicontinuity of the value
function.
Example. Consider the class of hidden information problems in which the planner has
an objective of the form:
∑
θt
f(at(θt))Pt(θt),
23a single agent has preferences:
2
∑
t=1
βt−1∑
θt
r(θt,at(θt))Pt(θ),
and shocks θt are i.i.d.. The planner maximizes her objective subject to each at(θt) ∈ A,
ﬁrst period incentive constraints, ∀(m1,m2) ∈ M,
r(  θm1,a1(  θm1)) + β
K
∑
l=1
r(  θl,a2(  θm1,   θl))P(  θl)
≥ r(  θm1,a1(  θm2)) + β
K
∑
l=1
r(  θl,a2(  θm2,   θl))P(  θl),
and second period constraints, , ∀(m1,m2) ∈ M, r(  θm1,a2(  θk,   θm1)) ≥ r(  θm1,a2(  θk,   θm2)).
Suppose that the agent’s action a can be decomposed into two components (a1,a2) ∈ A =
A1 × A2, where each Ak is an interval of R and that:
f(a) = f1(a1) + f2(θ,a2), a = (a1,a2),
and
r(θ,a) = r1(a1) + r2(θ,a2), a = (a1,a2).
This covers many cases. For example, if f1 = r1 = 0, f2(a2) = −a2 and r2(θ,a2) =
u(a2 + θ) the hidden endowment model of Thomas and Worrall (1990) is obtained. If
f1(a1) = −a1, r1(a1) = u(a1), f2(a2) = a2 and r2(θ,a2) = v(a2/θ), a two period Mirrlees
model is derived. In many applications, it is natural to assume that f1, f2, r1 and each
r2(θ, ) are concave. However, unless r1 and r2(θ, ) are linear, as they are, for example, in
Atkeson and Lucas (1992), the constraint correspondence does not have a convex graph.
Fortunately, alternative weaker assumptions are sufﬁcient for concavity/convexity of the
relevant value functions. For example, suppose, in addition to concavity, that f1 and f2
are decreasing, r1 and r2(θ, ) are increasing, and r2 has decreasing differences, i.e., for all
k = 1,...,K − 1, r2(  θk+1, ) − r2(  θk, ) is decreasing. These conditions are quite standard.
Suppose, in addition, r2 satisﬁes: for each δ ∈ (0,1), k = 1,...,K − 1 and pair a2 and a′
2,
let   a2 satisfy r2(  θk,  a2) = δr2(  θk,a2) + (1 − δ)r2(  θk,a2′
), then r2(  θk+1,  a2) > δr2(  θk+1,a2) +
(1 − δ)r2(  θk+1,a2′
). Under this assumption, each −Sk is convex. For example, in Thomas
and Worrall (1990)’s hidden endowment model, the agent’s utility function u is assumed
to be increasing, strictly concave and to satisfy NIARA. This is sufﬁcient to imply that the
analogues of −Sk are strictly convex. For further results see Sleet (2011).
245 A quartet of Bellman operators
The decompositions of the preceding sections made use of families of constraint or objec-
tive perturbed continuation problems. We now consider perturbing the original problem
in analogous ways. This leads to a fully recursive formulation. Moreover, the initial
perturbing parameter often has an economic interpretation as a utility promise or Pareto
weight.
Constraint-perturbed problems Given functions {g0,h}N
h=1, g0,h : A0 → R, and weights
p = {ph
k,n}, a family of auxiliary "promise constraints" is deﬁned according to, for h ∈
N = {1,    , N},
wh = g0,h(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
gk,n(ak)ph
k,n. (45)
Like the initial period incentive constraints, these depend on second period actions ak,
k ∈ K, via weighted sums of the functions gk,n. By augmenting the constraint set in
(SP), the equations (45) deﬁne a family of constraint-perturbed problems parameterized by
w ∈ RN:
S0(w) =



supΦ0(w) ∑
K
k=0 fk(ak)q0
k Φ(w)  = ∅
−∞ otherwise,
(46)
where
Φ0(w) =
 
a ∈ Ω1
 
 
   
 
∀h ∈ N,wh = g0,h(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
gk,n(ak)ph
k,n
 
.
Of course, P = supRN S0(w) = C[−S0](0).
Constraint-perturbed problems have a recursive formulation in terms of promises
which parallels the ﬁrst decomposition from the previous section. This formulation as-
sociates the new promise keeping constraints (45) and the initial tree-wide incentive con-
straints with the initial period. Elements in the range of the functions gk,n which appear
in both sets of constraints act as state variables. The formulation relates a ﬁrst period
constraint-perturbed problem to a family of second period constraint-perturbed prob-
lems (28) with value functions Sk. It is expressed in terms of a Bellman operator on the
space of functions W0 = {{Wk}k∈K|Wk ∈ FN
0 }.
Proposition 6. Deﬁne the primal constraint-perturbed Bellman operator TS : −W0 → −FN
0 ,
according to:
TS(W)(w) = sup
Ψ0(w)
f0(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
Wk(wk)q0
k,
25where : Ψ0(w) =
 
(a0,{w′
k}) ∈ Ψ0
 
 
   
 
∀h ∈ N,wh = g0,h(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nph
k,n
 
.
Then:
S0 = TS({Sk}). (47)
The proof is a straightforward extension of Proposition 1 and is omitted. Equation (47)
is the type of Bellman equation most commonly encountered in dynamic incentive prob-
lems. In these the functions fk are often interpreted as the per period payoffs of a commit-
ted principal. However, if the functions fk = 0, then the value functions Sk are indicator
functions for the sets of incentive-feasible promises at each node of the event tree. The
Bellman equation (47) is then closely related to the B-operator considered by Abreu et al
(1990). Properties of value sets emphasized by Abreu et al (1990) such as monotonicity
(in the set inclusion ordering) and closure, then translate into monotonicity and lower
semicontinuity of the value functions −Sk.
By dualizing the ﬁrst period incentive and promise constraints, the following problem
may be associated with (46):
SD
0 (w) = inf
RM
+ ×RN
sup
Ω2
K
∑
k=0
fk(ak)q0
k +
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
gk,n(ak)qm
k,n
 
+
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
gh
0(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
gk,n(ak)ph
k,n − wh
 
.
Along the lines of the third decomposition, this admits the recursive formulation:
SD
0 (w) = inf
RM
+ ×RN
sup
A0×RKN
f0(a0)q0
0 +
K
∑
k=1
Sk(wk)q0
k +
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n
 
+
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
gh
0(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nph
k,n − wh
 
.
Deﬁning the dual Bellman operator for the constraint perturbed problem as:
TS,D(W)(w) = inf
η∈RM
+,z∈RN
sup
A0×RKN
f0(a0)q0
0 +
K
∑
k=1
Wk(wk)q0
k
+
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n
 
+
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
gh
0(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqh
k,n − wh
 
,
we obtain: SD
0 = TS,D({Sk}).
26Objective-perturbed problems An objective-perturbed problem is parameterized by
z ∈ RN and is given by:
V0(z) = sup
Ω1
K
∑
k=0
fk(ak)q0
k +
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
g0,h(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
gk,n(ak)ph
k,n
 
. (48)
Thus, P = V0(0). Byextending our ﬁrst decomposition, a recursive formulation involving
weights may be associated with (48). This formulation relates a ﬁrst period objective-
perturbed problem to a family of second period objective-perturbed problems (31) with
value functions Vk. The next proposition states the formulation; it uses the deﬁnition
W = {{Wk}|Wk ∈ FN} ⊂ W0.
Proposition 7. Deﬁne the objective-perturbed Bellman operator TV : W0 → FN
0 ,
TV(W)(z) = sup
A0×RKN
inf
RM
+ ×RKN
f0(a0)q0
0 +
N
∑
h=1
zhgh
0(a0) +
M
∑
m=1
ηmgm
0 (a0)
+
K
∑
k=1
Wk(zk)q0
k +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
 
ζ′
k,n(z,η) − zk,n
 
q0
kwk,n, (49)
where: ζ′
k,n(z,η) = ∑
N
h=1 zh
ph
k,n
q0
k
+ ∑
M
m=1 ηm
qm
k,n
q0
k
. If {−Sk} ∈ W, then V0(z) = TV({Vk})(z).
Proof. See Appendix.  
The proof involves the dualization of the second period promise-keeping constraint.
The assumption in the proposition ensures the absence of a duality gap. Note that the
law of motion for the weight ζ′ now incorporates the initial weight z.
Although the Bellman operator (49) may initially appear unfamiliar, it is close to the
one used by Judd et al (2003) to compute the payoff surfaces of equilibrium value sets in
repeated games. To see this consider the case in which each fk = 0. Then, as before, the
value functions −Sk are indicator functions for the sets of incentive-feasible promises (or
payoffs) at each node of the event tree. The functions Vk are support functions for these
sets. In this case, TV({Vk})(z) may be rearranged to give:
TV({Vk})(z) = sup
A0×RKN
inf
RM
+ ×RKN
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
gh
0(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nph
k,n
 
(50)
+
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n
 
+
K
∑
k=1
q0
k
 
Vk(zk) −
N
∑
n=1
zk,nwk,n
 
.
27Equivalently, using the fact that Vk is a support function and, hence, homogenous of de-
gree 1,
TV({Vk})(z) = sup
A0×RKN
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
gh
0(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nph
k,n
 
s.t. ∀m ∈ M, gm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, inf
 zk =1
Vk(zk) −
N
∑
n=1
zk,nwk,n ≥ 0.
Judd et al (2003) consider an extension of this problem in which the consequence of a
player defection is endogenized. Here, this consequence is absorbed into the incentive
constraint functions gm
0 .
In (49), the second period promise-keeping constraint was dualized. By dualizing the
ﬁrst period incentive constraint, the following alternative problem may also be associated
with (48).16
VD
0 (z) =inf
RM
sup
Ω2
K
∑
k=0
fk(ak)q0
k +
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
g0,h(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
gk,n(ak)ph
k,n
 
(51)
+
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
gk,n(ak)qm
k,n
 
.
Following the fourth decomposition and the line of argument used to derive Proposi-
tion 5, we obtain our ﬁnal Bellman equation.
Proposition 8. Deﬁne the Bellman operator TV,D : W0 → FN
0 , according to:
TV,D(W)(z) = inf
RM
+
sup
A0
f0(a0)q0
0 +
N
∑
h=1
zhgh
0(a0) +
M
∑
m=1
ηmgm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
Wk(ζ′
k,n(z,η))q0
k,
where ζ′ is as before. Then: VD
0 = TV,D({Vk}).
The terms z and ζ′
k,n(z,η) may be interpreted as initial and updated weights on, re-
spectively, the function g0,h(a0) + ∑
K
k=1 ∑
N
n=1 gk,n(ak)ph
k,n and its continuations gk,n(ak).
The conditions for TV,D({Vk}) = V0 are stronger than those required for TV({Vk}) =
V0. Roughly, the optimization TV,D({Vk}) dualizes more of the constraint structure than
TV({Vk}). Weak duality arguments imply: TV,D(V)(z) ≥ TV({Vk})(z) ≥ V0(z) with
16As the fourth decomposition makes, this is essentially equivalent to dualizing the ﬁrst period recursive
incentive constraint and the second period promise-keeping constraint, i.e. dualizing all constraints that
link the ﬁrst and second periods.
28TV,D({Vk})(z) = V0(z) if and only if TV({Vk})(z) = V0(z) and there is a zero duality
gap between the values TV({Vk})(z) and TV,D({Vk})(z).
In the precedinganalysis, the ﬁrst period incentive constraints were dualized, whereas
the second period incentive constraints were not. Consequently, in deriving (51), detailed
speciﬁcation of the image spaces of the second period incentive functions, Yk, and their
duals was unnecessary. In contrast, if all constraints, ﬁrst and second period, were si-
multaneously dualized such speciﬁcation would be necessary. In this case, the dual of
each Yk contains the Lagrange multipliers on the k-th second period incentive constraint.
Application of the above approach to inﬁnite horizon settings allows us to work with
sequences of ﬁnite dimensional dual spaces, each housing current constraint Lagrange
multipliers, rather than a single inﬁnite dimensional dual space housing the multipliers
from all constraints. Technical complications stemming from an explicit treatment of the
latter are avoided.17
The Bellman operator TV,D is close to that derived by Marcet and Marimon (2011)
except that they leave some state variables and constraints in primal form. In addition,
theirderivation isquite different, relying onthe recursive decomposition ofasaddlepoint
rather than a dual problem.
Conjugacy relations for perturbed problems We round this section off by stating con-
jugacy relations between the value functions S0, V0, SD
0 and VD
0 . These are combined with
similar relations between S and V and the deﬁnitions of the Bellman operators to obtain
conjugacy relations between Bellman operators.
Exactly paralleling our discussion of the conjugacy of −Sk and Vk, we have the follow-
ing results.
Proposition 9. Assume that −S0 ∈ FN
0 , then 1) V0 = C[−S0] and V0 ∈ FN, 2) −S0 =
C[V0] if −S0 ∈ FN, and 3) Dom V0 = RN if and only if epi (−S0) contains no non-vertical
half-lines. In particular, this is true if ∑
K
k=0 fk(ak)q0
k is bounded above and each g0,h(a0) +
∑
K
k=1 ∑
N
n=1 gk,n(ak)ph
k,n is bounded on Ω1.
Proposition 10. Assume that VD
0 ∈ FN
0 , then 1) −SD
0 = C[VD
0 ] and −SD
0 ∈ FN, 2) VD
0 =
C[−SD
0 ] if VD
0 ∈ FN and 3) Dom SD
0 = RN if and only if epi (VD
0 ) contains no non-vertical
half-lines.
We exploit the connections between problems implied by Propositions 9 and 10 in
inﬁnite-horizon settings later in the paper. As in the discussion of properties of −Sk, the
17These complications include the explicit imposition of topological and linear structure on the inﬁnite
dimensional image space explicitly and the placing of further restrictions on the problem to ensure that
multipliers are summable, i.e. lie in the sub-space of bounded additive sequences.
29assumed properness of −S0 in Proposition 9 is mild, while convexity and lower semi-
continuity are signiﬁcantly stronger. Concavity of each fk and convexity of Graph Φ0
is sufﬁcient for convexity of −S0. Quasiconcavity of each gm
0 and gM+k
k coupled with
afﬁneness of each g0,h and gk,n is sufﬁcient of convexity of Graph Φ0. Weaker convex-like
conditions also sufﬁce.
ConjugacyrelationsforBellmanoperators Thevarious Bellmanoperatorsdeﬁnedabove
are related by conjugacy arguments.
Proposition 11. LetW ∈ W0, then1) TV(W) = C[−TS(−C[W])] ∈ W and2)−TS,D(−W) =
C[TV,D(C[W])] ∈ W.
Proof. See Appendix  
Corollary 2. 1) If −S ∈ W, then V0 = TV(V) = C[−TS(−C[V])]; 2) S0 = TS(S) and if
−S ∈ W and −S0 ∈ FN, then −S0 = C[TV(C[−S])].
Proof. If −S ∈ W, then −S = C2[−S] = C[V] and V0 = C[−S0] = C[−TS(S)] =
C[−TS(−C[V])] = TV(V). If −S0 ∈ FN, then −S0 = C2[−S0] = C[V0]. Hence, by the
last result, if −S ∈ W, then −S0 = C[V0] = C[TV(V)] = C[TV(C[−S])].  
Policies Our focus so farhas beenon optimal values. Itis well known that even ifstrong
duality obtains (i.e. primal and dual problems have equal optimal values and a minimiz-
ing multiplier exists for the dual problem), the set of actions that attain the supremum
in the dual problem may still be a strict superset of those that attain the optimum in the
primal problem. This point was made and elaborated in the context of dynamic incen-
tive problems by Messner and Pavoni (2004). We brieﬂy discuss additional conditions for
dual problem maximizers to solve the primal problem in Appendix B.
6 Inﬁnite horizon
The remainder of the paper extends the recursive formulations and dual relations from
the previous section to dynamic incentive problems in inﬁnite horizon settings. To keep
the exposition relatively simple, the focus is on problems with time-homogenous objec-
tives and constraints and a ﬁnite number of per period shock realizations. Time varying
problems and a continuum of shock realizations may be introduced at the cost of addi-
tional notation and an explicit treatment of measure-theoretic details. In inﬁnite horizon
30settings, a given problem is embedded within a family of perturbed problems. The as-
sociated primal or dual Bellman operator is then used to recover the true value function
(with an appeal to strong duality in the latter case). Policies are obtained subject to the
caveats elaborated above. Establishing that a value function from a problem satisﬁes an
associated Bellman equation proceeds along the lines described above. The recovery of
such value functions from the Bellman equation raises additional challenges as they may
be extended real valued. Convergent value function iteration requires function conver-
gence concepts for such settings and/or further reﬁnement of the set of candidate value
functions. We turn to these issues next.
6.1 Inﬁnite horizon framework
A framework that accommodates many inﬁnite horizon dynamic incentive problems is
now speciﬁed. In these problems the objective is often explicitly identiﬁed as a social
payoff and we label it as such. The auxiliary variables that are used to perturb constraints
in the objective are identiﬁed with private agent payoffs.
6.1.1 Shocks and agents.
Let I = {1,..., I} denote a ﬁnite set of agents and Θ = {  θk}K
k=1 ⊂ RS a ﬁnite set of
shocks with K = {1,    ,K} the corresponding set of shock indices. In speciﬁc contract-
ing problems these shocks may include components that affect a group of agents and/or
components that are idiosyncratic to a speciﬁc agent. In the latter case, these components
may be common knowledge or privately observed by the affected agent. The shock pro-
cess is described by a probability space (Θ∞,G,P). This process is assumed either to be
Markov with transition matrix π = {πk,l} and initial seed shock   θj ∈ Θ or i.i.d. with
per period distribution π = {πl}. The random variables describing t-period shocks and
t-period histories of shocks are denoted θt and θt respectively. The corresponding proba-
bility distribution for the latter is denoted Pj(θt) (or just P(θt) in the i.i.d. case).
6.1.2 Action plans.
Let A : Θ ։ RL denote a correspondence mapping states to action sets. A period t action
proﬁle is a function at : Θt → RL with at(θt) ∈ A(θt). A plan is a sequence of action
proﬁles α = {at}∞
t=1 belonging to a set Ω. It is often convenient to express plans in the
form: α = {ak,α′
k}K
k=1, where ak = a1(  θk) and α′
k = {at+1(  θk, )}∞
t=1. Ω is assumed to
satisfy the following condition.
31Assumption 1. Ω is a non-empty subset of {{at}∞
t=1, at : Θt → RN, at(θt) ∈ A(θt)}. If
α ∈ Ω, then each continuation α′
k is also in Ω.
6.1.3 Social and private payoffs.
Let f : Graph A → R denote the per period social payoff and βP ∈ (0,1) the social
discount factor. The following is assumed.
Assumption 2. βP, f,π and Ω are such that for all k and α ∈ Ω,
Fk(α) := E
  ∞
∑
t=1
βt−1
P f(θt,at(θt))
 
   θ1 =   θk
 
is well deﬁned and ﬁnite.
Fk(α) gives the social payoff conditional on the period 1 shock. The social objective is
identiﬁed with the unconditional payoff ∑k∈K Fk(α)πj,k.
Remark 2. Dynamic incentive problems can be formulated as games and incentive con-
straints derived as equilibrium restrictions. In many settings the social objective may
be identiﬁed with that of a committed mechanism designer and equilibria that are best
from her perspective found. Alternatively, with an appropriate speciﬁcation of the social
payoff, the entire set of equilibrium payoffs. See Example 3 below.
The private payoff to the i-th agent conditional on shock   θk is deﬁned by a tuple
(ri, βA,π), with ri : Graph A → R and βA ∈ (0,1), according to:
Ri
k(α) = E
  ∞
∑
t=1
βt−1
A ri(θt,at(θt))
 
 
 θ1 =   θk
 
.
βA is a common private agent discount factor. The following assumption is made.
Assumption 3. βA,{ri},π and Ω are such that for all i, k and α ∈ Ω, Ri
k(α) is well deﬁned
and ﬁnite.
For α = {ak,α′
k}k∈K, the deﬁnition of Ri
k implies:
Ri
k(α) = ri(  θk,ak) + βA ∑
l∈K
Ri
l(α′
k)πk,l.
6.1.4 Constraints.
Incentiveconstraints ensure thatitisinthe interests ofagentstotake prescribed coursesof
actions. These constraints are expressed in terms of private agent payoffs. Let M denote
32a ﬁnite set of constraint indices with cardinality M. Call G : Ω → RM the current incentive
constraint mapping, where:
G(α) =
 
∑
k∈K
gm
0,k(ak) + βA∑
i∈I
∑
k∈K
∑
l∈K
Ri
l(α′
k)qm
i,k,l
 
m∈M
. (52)
G is a specialized version of the constraint functions considered in Section 4. The continu-
ation constraint functions previously denoted gk,n are now identiﬁed with sums of agent
continuation payoffs and denoted accordingly. Explicit examples are given below.
An important special case of eq. (52) occurs when the coefﬁcients qm
i,k,l can be decom-
posed as:
qm
i,k,l = qm
i,kπk,l (k,l) ∈ K2. (53)
Then,
∑
k∈K
∑
l∈K
qm
i,k,lRi
l(α′
k) = ∑
k∈K
qm
i,k ∑
l∈K
Ri
l(α′
k)πk,l
and, for each k, the relative weighting of the continuation payoffs {Ri
l(α′
k)}l∈K coincides
with the probability distribution {πk,l}l∈K. As will become clear this constraint structure
affords a considerable simpliﬁcation of the analysis and is quite common in applications.
Letαt(θt−1) denotethecontinuation of α afterθt−1. Deﬁnethesetofincentive-constrained
allocations Ω1 ⊂ Ω according to:
Ω1 = {α ∈ Ω|∀t,θt−1,G(αt(θt−1)) ≥ 0}. (54)
In addition, let Ω2 = {{ak,α′
k} ∈ Ω|each α′
k ∈ Ω1} be the set of plans that satisfy the
incentive constraints from t = 2 onwards.
Assumption 4. Ω1 is non-empty.
6.1.5 Societal choice problem.
The remainder of the paper considers choice problems of the form:
sup
α∈Ω1
∑
k∈K
Fk(α)πj,k. (55)
and perturbations thereof. The following is assumed.
Assumption 5. βA, f,{ri},π and Ω are such that for all j, supα∈Ω1 ∑k∈K Fk(α)πj,k < ∞.
336.2 Examples
Example 1. Atkeson-Lucas component planner with i.i.d shocks. As in Section 2, an
agent receivesprivately observed, i.i.d. taste shocks {θt}. These perturb the agent’s utility
from consumption {ct}:
liminf
T
T
∑
t=1
βt−1∑
θt
θtv(ct(θt))Pt(θt). (56)
In eq. (56), β ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor and v : R+ → A ⊆ R is a per period utility. v
is assumed increasing, concave and continuous with inverse C = A → R+. Attention is
restricted to allocations such that limT ∑
T
t=1 βt−1 ∑θt θtv(ct(θt))Pt(θt) exists and is ﬁnite.
The planner maximizes agent utility net of resource costs:
∞
∑
t=1
βt−1∑
θt
 
θtv(ct(θt)) − Qct(θt)
 
Pt(θt) (57)
subject to the incentive constraints, for all t, θt−1, m1  = m2 ∈ K,
  θm1v(ct(θt−1,   θm1)) + β
∞
∑
r=1
βr−1∑
θr
θrv(ct+r(θt−1,   θm1,θr))Pr(θr)
≥   θm1v(ct(θt−1,   θm2)) + β
∞
∑
r=1
βr−1∑
θr
θrv(ct+r(θt−1,   θm2,θr))Pr(θr).
Itisstraightforward to map this model into our general framework. Deﬁne the t-th period
action at(θt) = v(ct(θt)) and let:
Ω =
 
{at}
   
 each at(θt) ∈ A and lim
T→∞
T
∑
t=1
βt−1∑
θt
θtat(θt)Pt(θt) exists and is ﬁnite
 
.
Let the per period social and private payoffs be given by:
f(θ,a) = θa − QC(a) and r(θ,a) = θa.
Set βP = βA = β. The aggregators F and R are then deﬁned in the obvious ways. Let
M = {(m1,m2) ∈ K2, m1  = m2}, and collect current constraints together as:
G(α) =
 
  θm1am1 −   θm1am2 + β ∑
l∈K
Rl(α′
m1)πl − β ∑
l∈K
Rl(α′
m2)πl
 
(m1,m2)∈M
≥ 0. (58)
34Thus, constraints can be written in the form (52) with g
m1,m2
0 (a) =   θm1am1 −   θm1am2 and
q
m1,m2
k,l = q
m1,m2
k πl, where q
m1,m2
k equals 1 if k = m1, −1 if k = m2, and 0 otherwise.  
This example can be extended to accommodate Farhi and Werning (2007)’s formula-
tion by setting the societal discount factor βP strictly larger than the private one βA. The
aggregator F incorporates the discount factor βP, while R incorporates βA. The con-
straint function remains the same.
Example 2. Atkeson-Lucas component planner with Markov shocks. The next exam-
ple is identical to Example 1, except that shocks evolve according to a Markov process
with kernel π. In this case, q
m1,m2
k,l equals πm1,l if k = m1, −πm1,l if k = m2, and 0 other-
wise. These q weights do not in general satisfy eq. (53). Thus, the relative weighting of
future plans can differ across the objective and constraints. Consider the action path after
some history (    ,   θk,   θl). The agent payoff associated with this path receives a weight
proportional to πk,l in the objective and the (k,m2)-th (m2  = k) constraint, but a weight
proportional to −πm1,l in the (m1,k)-th (m1  = k) constraint. Such variation in weighting
across constraints complicates the history dependence of the optimal allocation and the
recursive formulation necessary to ﬁnd it.  
Example 3. Kocherlakota’s model of no commitment. The second example of Section 2
can be extended to an inﬁnite-horizon setting to give the model of Kocherlakota (1996).
Everything is as before except that now agents m1 ∈ I live for an inﬁnite number of
periods, have an outside utility option Vm1 : Θ → R in each period and face the per
period incentive constraints, for all t, θt−1 and m2 ∈ K,
v(c
m1
t (θt−1,   θm2)) + β
∞
∑
r=1
βr−1∑
θr
v(c
m1
t (θt−1,   θm2,θr))P(θr|  θm2) ≥ Vm1(  θm2).
Identifying action plans with consumption allocations and setting βA = β, the current
incentive constraints can be expressed as:
G(α) =
 
v(a
m1
m2) − Vm1(  θm2) + β ∑
l∈K
R
m1
l (α′
m2)πm2,l
 
(m1,m2)∈M
≥ 0, (59)
where M = I × K. Thus, constraints can be written in the form (52) with g
m1,m2
0 (a) =
v(a
m1
m2) − Vm1(  θm2), q
m1,m2
i,k,l = q
m1,m2
i,k πk,l and q
m1,m2
i,k = 1 if i = m1 and k = m2 and 0 other-
wise. It follows that the weights q
m1,m2
i,k,l satisfy eq. (53).
Let f(θ,a) = 0 and set Fk(α) = ∑
∞
t=1 ∑Θt βt−1
P f(θt,at(θt))P(θt|  θk) = 0 for some
βP ∈ (0,1). Then identifying Ω1 with the set of plans satisfying (59) one obtains the
35optimization: sup0 subject to α ∈ Ω1. This is trivial if Ω1 is (assumed) non-empty. Its
constraint-perturbed variation identiﬁes whether a given utility promise w ∈ RI is feasi-
ble or not:
Sj(w) =



supΩ1,j(w) ∑
K
k=1 Fk(α)πj,k if Ω1,j(w)  = ∅
−∞ otherwise,
where Ω1,j(w) denotes the set of plans in Ω1 which deliver w to agents in shock state j.
Sj is then simply an indicator function for the set of incentive-feasible payoffs. The value
function from the objective-perturbed version of this problem gives the support function
of this payoff set.18,19  
7 Constraint-perturbed incentive problems
Thissection considersincentive-constrained problemsperturbed withinitial utilitypromises
to private agents.
7.1 Constraint-perturbed problem
Agents are partitioned into two groups: I1 and I2. I1 consists of those agents for whom
each qm
i satisﬁes eq. (53). I2 consists of the remaining agents. Let N = |I1|+ K|I2|. Deﬁne
the constraint-perturbed problem by:
Sj(w) =
 
supα∈Ω1,j(w) ∑k Fk(α)πj,k if Ω1,j(w)  = ∅
−∞ otherwise
(60)
where w ∈ RN and
Ω1,j(w) =
 
α ∈ Ω1
 
   
 
 
wi = ∑
k∈K
Ri
k(α)πj,k, i ∈ I1, and wi
k = Ri
k(α), i ∈ I2
 
. (61)
w ∈ RN is referred to as a promise. Agents i ∈ I1 receive ex ante promises that do
not depend on the ﬁrst period shock k; agents i ∈ I2 receive ex post utility promises that
18An alternative approach maximizes the utility of a player subject to incentive constraints and the de-
livery of utility promises to the other I − 1 players. This approach incorporates the continuation value
function of the maximized player into the constraint set. See Kocherlakota (1996) and Rustichini (1998).
19In the current example, as in Kocherlakota (1996), the outside utility option is exogenously given. Our
approaches can be readily extended to accommodate the case in which these are determined endogenously
as payoffs from continuation sub-game perfect equilibria. In this case, the B-operator of Abreu et al (1990)
is recovered as a Bellman operator on a space of indicator functions.
36do.20 (60) augments the original societal choice problem with additional promise-keeping
constraints (contained in (61)). Let Dom Sj = {w|Sj(w) > −∞} = {w : Ω1,j(w)  = ∅}
denote the effective domain of Sj and let S = {Sj}j∈K. We note the following immediate
implication of our assumptions.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 2-5, −S ∈ W0 and, for each j, Dom Sj  = ∅.
Proof. By Assumptions 3 and 4, there is some w such that α ∈ Ω1,j(w)  = ∅. By Assump-
tion 2 and the deﬁnition of Sj, −Sj(w) < ∞. Hence, Dom Sj  = ∅. By Assumption 5,
infw −Sj(w) > −∞ and so −Sj is proper. Since j was arbitrary, the result follows.  
7.2 Constraint-perturbed Bellman equations
Inspection of (60) reveals that it has essentially the same structure as the constraint per-
turbed problems considered in Section 5. This is easily seen by deﬁning, for a ﬁxed
j ∈ K, A0 = ∏
K
k=1 A(  θk), each Ak = Ω1, N = I1 ∪ (I2 × K), f0(a) = ∑
K
k=1 f(  θk,ak)πj,k,
fk(α′
k) = ∑
K
l=1Fl(α′
k)πk,l, q0
k = βπj,k,
g0,h(a) =

   
   
∑
K
k=1 ri(  θk,ak)πj,k h = i ∈ I1
ri(  θk,ak) h = (i,k) ∈ I2 × K
gk,n(α′
k) =

   
   
∑
K
k=1Ri
l(α′
k)πk,l n = i ∈ I1
Ri
l(α′
k) n = (i,l) ∈ I2 × K,
pi
k,i = πj,k if i ∈ I1 and p
i,k
k,i,l = πk,l if i ∈ I2. The objective, promise and incentive-
constraints maybere-expressed in termsofthese functions andweights. Pursuing exactly
the line of argument in Section 5, let
Ψj(w) =

 
 
(a,w′)
 
 
   
 
 
 
wi = ∑K[ri(  θk,ak) + βAw′
i,k]πj,k, i ∈ I1
wi,k = ri(  θk,ak) + βA ∑K w′
i,k,lπk,l, i ∈ I2, k ∈ K
gm
0 (a) + βA ∑I1,K qm
i,kw′
i,k + βA ∑I2,K,K qm
i,k,lw′
i,k,l ≥ 0, m ∈ M

 
 
.
Then as a corollary to Proposition 6, we obtain the following result.
20In principle any agent could receive an ex ante or ex post utility promise. But the subsequent recursive
formulation relies on ex ante promises for I1 agents and ex post promises for I2.
37Corollary 3. Deﬁne TS : −W0 → −W0 by TS = {TS
j }j∈K with for all W ∈ −W0,
TS
j (W)(w) =



sup (a,w′)∈Ψj(w) ∑k∈K
 
f(  θk,ak) + βWk(w′
k)
 
πj,k Ψj(w)  = ∅
−∞ otherwise.
Then: S = TS(S).
The ﬁrst period incentive constraints in (60) may be dualized to give:
SD
j (w) = inf
RM×RN
sup
A×RKN ∑
k∈K
 
f(  θk,ak) + βPSk(w′
k)
 
πj,k (62)
+ ∑
i∈I1
ζi
 
∑
k∈K
[ri(  θk,ak) + βAw′
i,k]πj,k − wi
 
+ ∑
i∈I2
∑
k∈K
ζi
k
 
ri(  θk,ak) + βA ∑
l∈K
w′
i,k,lπk,l − wi
k
 
πj,k
+∑
m
ηm
 
gm
0 (a) + βA ∑
I1,K
qm
i,kw′
i,k + βA ∑
I2,K
qm
i,k,lw′
i,k,l
 
.
Then as a corollary to the discussion following Proposition 6 we obtain the following
result.
Corollary 4. Deﬁne TS,D : −W0 → −W0 by TS,D = {T
S,D
j }j∈K with for all W ∈ −W0,
T
S,D
j (W)(w) = inf
RM×RN
sup
A×RKN ∑
k∈K
 
f(  θk,ak) + βPWk(w′
k)
 
πj,k (63)
+ ∑
i∈I1
ζi
 
∑
k∈K
[ri(  θk,ak) + βAw′
i,k]πj,k − wi
 
+ ∑
i∈I2
∑
k∈K
ζi
k
 
ri(  θk,ak) + βA ∑
l∈K
w′
i,k,lπk,l − wi
k
 
πj,k
+∑
m
ηm
 
gm
0 (a) + βA ∑
I1,K
qm
i,kw′
i,k + βA ∑
I2,K
qm
i,k,lw′
i,k,l
 
.
Then: SD = TS,D(S).
388 Objective-perturbed incentive problems
This section considers dynamic incentive problems whose objectives are perturbed with
weighted utilities of private agents.
8.1 Objective-perturbed problem
Deﬁne the objective-perturbed problem:
Vj(ζ) = sup
α∈Ω1
∑
k∈K
Fk(α)πj,k + ∑
i∈I1
ζi ∑
l∈K
Ri
k(α)πj,k + ∑
i∈I2
∑
k∈K
ζi
kRi
k(α)πj,k (64)
andletV = {Vj}j∈K. Theproblem in eq.(64)perturbs the objective from the date t societal
problem (55) with weighted sums of private payoffs Ri
k(α). The weights are collected into
ζ ∈ RN. For agents i ∈ I2, these weights are allowed to depend on the current shock   θk.
Assumptions 1-4 ensure that Ω1 is non-empty and that the objective in eq. (64) is well
deﬁned and real-valued on Ω1. Hence, Vj : RN → R ∪ {∞} is also well deﬁned, though
possibly inﬁnite-valued. Let Dom Vj = {ζ ∈ RN | Vj(ζ) < ∞} ⊆ RN denote the effective
domain of Vj and Dom V = {(ζ, j) ∈ RN ×K|Vj(ζ) < ∞} the effective domain of V.
8.2 Objective-perturbed Bellman equations
Problem (64) has the same structure as the objective-perturbed problems considered in
Section 5. The following result is derived as a corollary to Proposition 7.
Corollary 5. Deﬁne the operator TV : W0 → W0 by TV = {TV
j }j∈K with for all W ∈ W0,
TV
j (W)(ζ) = sup
A×RKN
inf
RM
+×RKN
 
f(  θk,   uk) + ∑
m∈M
ηm
πj,k
gm
0,k(  ak) + ∑
i∈I1
ζiri(  θk,  ak) + ∑
i∈I2
ζi
kri(  θk,  ak)
+βP
 
W(zk) +
βA
βP ∑
k∈K
 
ζ′
j,k(ζ,η) − zk,wk
   
πj,k, (65)
where  x,y  = ∑i∈I1 xiyi + ∑i∈I2 ∑l∈K xi,lyi,lπk,l, wk = {{wi
k}I1,{wi
k,l}I2×K} and
ζi′
j,k(ζ,η) =
βA
βP
 
ζi + ∑
m∈M
ηmqm
i,k
πj,k
 
, i ∈ I1, j and k ∈ K, (66)
ζi′
j,k,l(ζ,η) =
βA
βP
 
ζi
k + ∑
m∈M
ηmqm
i,k,l
πj,kπk,l
 
, i ∈ I2, j, k and l ∈ K.
Then if −S ∈ W, V = TV(V).
39Alternatively, dualizing the ﬁrst period recursive incentive and promise-keeping con-
straints, we obtain:
VD
j (ζ) = inf
RM
+ ×RKN
sup
A×RKN ∑
k∈K
 
f(  θk,  ak) + ∑
m∈M
ηm
πj,k
gm
0,k(  ak) + ∑
i∈I1
ζiri(  θk,  ak) + ∑
i∈I2
ζi
kri(  θk,  ak)
+βP
 
V(zk) +
βA
βP ∑
k∈K
 
ζ′
j,k(ζ,η) − zk,wk
   
πj,k. (67)
Then, as a corollary to Proposition 8 we have the following result.
Corollary 6. Deﬁne the operator TV,D : W0 → W0 by TV,D = {T
V,D
j }j∈K with
T
V,D
j (W)(ζ) =inf
RM
+
sup
A ∑
k∈K
 
f(  θk,  ak) + ∑
m∈M
ηm
πj,k
gm
0,k(  ak) + ∑
i∈I1
ζiri(  θk,  ak)
+ ∑
i∈I2
ζi
kri(  θk,  ak) + βPW(ζ′
j,k(ζ,η))
 
πj,k, (68)
then VD = TV,D(V).
9 Duality relations for incentive problems
9.1 Duality of value functions and state spaces
Duality results from Section 4 are applicable. The following propositions are immediate
consequences of Lemma 1 and Propositions 9 to 10.
Proposition 12. GivenAssumptions2-5, 1)V = C[−S] andV ∈ W; 2)−S = C[V] if−S ∈ W
and 3) each Dom Vj is convex and non-empty. Also, Dom Vj = RN if and only if epi (−Sj)
contains no non-vertical half-lines. A sufﬁcient condition for the latter is that each Fk is bounded
above and each Ri
k is bounded.
Proposition 13. Assume that VD ∈ W0, then 1) −SD = C[VD] and −SD ∈ W; 2) VD =
C[−SD] if VD ∈ W and 3) each Dom SD
j is convex and non-empty. Also, Dom SD
j = RN if and
only if epi (VD
j ) contains no non-vertical half-lines.
Earlier remarks on functions and their conjugates are applicable here. V and −SD are
convex and lowersemicontinuous (given the properness of −S and VD). Other properties
are inherited via conjugacy arguments. In particular, conditions for strict convexity and
differentiability of −Sj have been established in several settings21 and so, under these
21For example, Atkeson and Lucas (1992), Atkeson and Lucas (1995), Farhi and Werning (2007).
40conditions, Vj is strictly convex and continuously differentiability on the interior of its
domain as well.
In summary, each value function (and effective domain) can be characterized directly
or via the conjugacy properties of the other. In a given application, the most convenient
route may be chosen.
9.2 Conjugacy of TV and TS.
Proposition 11 has immediate application to dynamic incentive problems. It implies that,
for W ∈ W0,
TV(W) = C[−TS(−C[W])] and TS,D(W) = −C[TV,D(C[−W])]. (69)
If TS : W → W, then, for W ∈ W, −TS(−W) = C[TV(C[W])] and the Bellman operators
TS and TV are conjugate in the sense that (modulo sign changes) applying the Legendre-
Fenchel transform, then one of the operators and then the transform again is equivalent
to applying the other operator. If, in addition, TV,D = TV on W, then TV,D and TS are
conjugate as well.
9.3 Conjugacy in value iteration
Ultimately our goal in deriving Bellman equations is to use them to solve problems. This
section begins our discussion of this by relating value iteration under the various Bell-
man operators introduced in the preceding discussion. The corollary is an immediate
implication of eq. (69) and the above discussion.
Corollary 7. Suppose that −S0 ∈ W and for r = 0,1,..., −Sr+1 = −TSSr ∈ W. Then for
r = 0,1,..., C[−Sr+1] = TVC[−Sr]. If, in addition, TV,D = TV on W, then for r = 0,1,...,
C[−Sr+1] = TV,DC[−Sr]. Suppose that V0 ∈ W and for r = 0,1,..., Vr+1 = TV,DVr ∈ W.
Then for r = 0,1,..., −C[Vr+1] = TS,D(−C[Sr]). If, in addition, TS = TS,D on W, then for
r = 0,1,..., −C[Vr+1] = TS(−C[Vr]).
Proof. If −Sr ∈ W, then TV(C[−Sr]) = C[−TS(−C2[−Sr])] = C[−TS(Sr)] = C[−Sr+1].
The ﬁrst part of the result then follows by induction from r = 0. The second part of the
result is immediate. The remainder follows by an analogous argument.  
Consequently, if repeated application of TS to S0 induces a sequence of functions
whose negatives are in W, then repeated application of TV to C[−S0] induces the corre-
sponding sequence of conjugates. If TV,D = TV on W, then of, course, the same sequence
41of conjugates is generated by repeated application of TV,D. Similar relations hold with
respect to iteration on TV,D from V0 and TS,D from −C[V0].
We are led to consider whether convergent-TS (resp. -TV,D) value iteration implies
convergent-TV (resp. -TS,D) value iteration.
Deﬁnition 2. A sequence of functions {fr}∞
r=1, fr : RN → R is said to epiconverge to
f : RN → R written fr e → f if for any x, 1) ∀xr → x, liminfr fr(xr) ≥ f(x) and 2)
∃xr → x, limsupr fr(xr) ≤ f(x). f is called the epi-limit of {fr}∞
r=1.
Extending this deﬁnition slightly, we will say that a sequence {Wr} in W0 or W epi-
converges to W (in W0 or W) if each Wr,k
e → Wk. We will write Wr
e → W. Epiconvergent
sequences of functions have several desirable properties. In particular, the limit of a se-
quence of minimizers for an epiconvergent function sequence is the minimizer of the
epi-limit.22 Epiconvergence also relates well to the conjugation operation. Speciﬁcally, by
a well known theorem of Wijsman, the Fenchel transform is epi-continuous on W, i.e. if
the functions Wr and W belong to W, then Wr
e → W ⇐⇒ C[Wr]
e → C[W]. This result has
the following implication for our setting.
Proposition 14. Let −S0 ∈ W and for r = 0,1,..., Sr+1 = TS(Sr). Suppose that each −Sr ∈
W and that −Sr
e → −S∞. Let Vr = C[−Sr]. Then Vr+1 = TV(Vr) and Vr
e → V∞ = C[−S∞].
Let V0 ∈ W and for r = 0,1,... Vr+1 = TV,D(Vr). Suppose that each Vr ∈ W and that
Vr
e → V∞. Let Sr = −C[Vr]. Then Sr+1 = TS,DSr and −Sr
e → −S∞ = C[V∞].
In summary, epiconvergent TS (resp. TV,D) value iteration from some W0 ∈ W, im-
plies epiconvergent TV (resp. TS,D) value iteration from C[−W0] (resp. −C[W0]). Modulo
sign changes, the limit of the latter iteration is the conjugate of the limit of the former.
Contractive relations Recall that the Fenchel transform is a one-to-one mapping on
W with C[W] = C−1[W], W ∈ W. Let (D,ρ) with D ⊆ W be a metric space. Then
(C(D),φ) with φ(W′,W′′) = ρ(C−1(W′),C−1(W′′)) = ρ(C(W′),C(W′′)) is isometric to
(D,ρ). In particular, if (D,ρ) is complete, then so is (C(D),φ). Suppose that S ∈ D,
(D,ρ) is complete, TS : D → D and TS is contractive on (D,ρ). Then, by the contrac-
tion mapping theorem, S is the unique ﬁxed point of TS on D and for any sequence
{Sr} with S0 ∈ D and Sr+1 = TSSr, Sr
ρ
→ S. By Corollary 7, the sequence of func-
tions Vr+1 = TVVr, with V0 = C[−S0], corresponds to the sequence of conjugates of {Sr}.
Hence, φ(Vr,C[−S]) = ρ(Sr,S) and so iterative application of TV to C[−S0] induces a
22For this reason, epiconvergence is more useful than pointwise convergence which relates poorly to
maximization andminimization. On the otherhand, uniform convergence(orweighted norm convergence)
which relates well is stronger and more restrictive.
42sequence that φ-converges to C[−S]. If TV,D = TV on C[D], then iterative application of
TV,D to C[−S0] converges to C[−S].
10 Dynamic programming
The previous section related convergent value iteration across cases. This section gives
sufﬁcient conditions for such convergence. Section 10.1 considers TS-value iteration and
provides sufﬁcient conditions for it to generate an epiconvergent sequence (with limit
−S) on W. Epiconvergence of TV-value iteration (to V) then follows from the results in
the preceding section. The key condition is the existence of a bounding function S0 for
S that has bounded level sets and that becomes arbitrarily negative as expected future
utilities become arbitrarily large. This condition subsumes the stronger requirement that
agents have bounded utilities used in, for example, Abreu et al (1990).
Epiconvergence is well suited to handling the convergence of possibly extended real-
valued functions. However, when the effective domain of the relevant value function
is known, it is sometimes possible to reﬁne the set of candidate value functions so that
the Bellman operator is a contractive upon it. In particular, we have previously noted
that the effective domain of the objective-perturbed value function is all of RN when the
social objective is bounded above and agent utilities are bounded. Section 10.2 develops
contractive arguments for this case.
10.1 Level bounded problems
Let W = {W = {Wk}|Wk : RN → R} denote the set of extended real valued functions
with domain K × RN. For W and W′ ∈ W, let W ≥ W′ denote for all k,w, Wk(w) ≥
W′
k(w). For W ∈ W, deﬁne U(W) = {Uj(W)}j∈K, where:
Uj(W)(w,a,w′) :=



∑k∈K
 
f(  θk,ak) + βPWk(w′
k)
 
πj,k if Ψj(w)  = ∅
−∞ otherwise.
Given u ∈ R, levuUj(W)(w, ) := {(a,w′)|Uj(W)(w,a,w′) ≥ u} is called the u-level
set of Uj(W)(w, ). Uj(W)(w, ) is said to be level bounded if for every u ∈ R the set
levuUj(W)(w, ) is bounded (and possibly empty). Uj(W) is said to be level bounded lo-
cally in w if for each   w ∈ RN and u ∈ R there is a neighbourhood V of   w and a bounded
set B such that levuUj(W)(w, ) ⊂ B for each w ∈ V. IfeachUj(W), j ∈ K islevel bounded
locally in w, then U(W) is said to be locally level bounded in w. Clearly, if each f(  θk, )
43and Wk are level bounded, then Uj(W) is level bounded locally in w.
Lemma 2. Let W ≥ W′ ∈ W. If U(W) is level bounded locally in w, then U(W′) is level
bounded locally in w.
Proof. See Appendix.  
Lemma 3. Assume that Uj(W) 1) belongs to −W0, 2) is upper semicontinuous and 3) is level-
bounded locally in w. Then TS
j (W) belongs to −W0 and is upper semicontinuous. In addition,
if TS
j (W)(w) > −∞, then Γj(w) = argminUj(W)(w, ) is non-empty and compact, otherwise
it is empty. If (av,w
′v) ∈ Γj(wv), wv → w and TS
j (wv) → TS
j (w) > −∞, then (av,w
′v) is
bounded and its cluster points lie in Γj(w).
Proof. See Appendix.  
The following assumption is placed on primitives in the remainder of the section.
Assumption 6. Each function f(  θk, ) is upper semicontinuous and bounded above on A(  θk).
Remark 3. Much of the dynamic incentive literature assumes continuity of the social ob-
jective functions f(  θk, ). It is also standard to identify the latter with a bounded sum of
agent utilities or a sum of agent utilities net of a resource costs that is bounded above. All
of the previously described examples satisfy Assumption 6.
Theorem 8. Let Assumption 6 holds and let S0 ∈ −W0 be upper semicontinuous. Suppose that
1) Uj(S0) is level bounded locally in w, 2) S0 ≥ TS(S0), and 3) S0 ≥ S. For n = 0,1,2,..., let
Sn+1 = TSSn. Then the sequence {Sn} has a pointwise limit S∞ ≥ S with S∞ = TSS∞.
Proof. See Appendix.  
Given W ∈ W, let W(  θk,w) := Wk(w). We will call a function W ∈ W coercive in
expectation if for all j ∈ K and {wt+1 : Θt → RN} such that lim βt
AE[ wt+1 |θ0 =   θj]  = 0,
βt
PE[W(θt,wt+1(θt))|θ0 =   θj] → ∞.
Remark 4. Coercivity in expectation is satisﬁed if each Wk is ﬁnite on a bounded set and
is otherwise ∞. The negative of the true value function S satisﬁes this condition when
agent utilities are bounded. Alternatively, coercivity in expectation is satisﬁed if each
Wk is proper, lower semicontinuous, level bounded and convex (in which case it is level
coercive, i.e. liminf w  Wk(w)/ w  > 0, see Rockafellar and Wets (1998), p. 92).
Theorem 9. Let the assumptions of Theorem 8 hold. Assume additionally that −S0 ∈ W0 is
coercive in expectation. For n = 0,1,..., let Sn+1 = TSSn. Then the sequence of functions of
{Sn} epiconverges to S.
44Proof. See Appendix.  
We say that the problems deﬁned by TSW are concave-like if for each j, (w0,a0,w0′),
(w1,a1,w1′) and λ ∈ [0,1], there is a (aλ,wλ′) such that Uj(W)(λw0 + (1 − λ)w1,aλ,wλ′)
≥ λ Uj(W)(w0,a0,w0′) + (1 − λ) Uj(W)(w,a1,w1′). Note that concave-likeness does not
require that aλ and wλ′ are convex combinations of a0 and a1 and w0′ and w1′. It is easy to
see that if the problems deﬁned by TS(W) are concave-like, then TS(W) is concave.
Assumption 7. If −W ∈ W, then the family of problems deﬁned by TS(W) are concave-like.
The following result is then immediate.
Theorem 10. Under Assumption 7 and the assumptions of Theorem 9, the sequence of functions
{−Sn} epiconverges to −S and {Sn} ∪ {S} ⊂ W.
Proof. Follows from preceding discussion, Theorem 9 and the fact that set of convex
functions is closed under pointwise convergence.  
Hence, from our earlierresults, under the conditions of Theorem 10 the sequence {Vn}
with V0 = C[−S0] and, for n = 0,1,..., Vn+1 = TVVn epiconverges to C[−S]. Moreover,
following the argument from Section 4, V = C[−S] is the true objective perturbed value
function. Also, if TV,D = TV, then V may be obtained by iterating on TV,D from C[−S].
10.2 Contraction mapping based approaches (Preliminary)
It is sometimes possible to reﬁne the set of candidate value functions so that the Bellman
operator is contractive upon it. Sharper characterizations of the true value function and
rates of convergence for value iteration are then available.
As had been emphasized, the optimal value functions from dynamic incentive prob-
lems are often unbounded and extended real valued. A further difﬁculty concerns the
fact that the conventional theorem of the maximum is often not available because the
constraint correspondence is not compact-valued or upper hemicontinuous. In this sec-
tion tighter restrictions are made on the problem to alleviate these difﬁculties.
The following assumptions are made.
Assumption 8. (Bounds) The functions ri(  θk, ) have ﬁnite inﬁma and suprema given by ri
k and
ri
k. For each   θk, f is bounded above on Graph A.
Assumption 9. (Convexity) The problem (64) is convex-like with respect to perturbations of the
incentive constraints, for example f(θ, ) is concave for all θ, ri(θ, ) is afﬁne and G is concave.
45Assumption 10. (Slater) There is an α ∈ Ω such that G(α) > 0.
Assumption 8 ensures that each Vj : RN → R is convex and continuous. Assumptions
9 and 10 guarantee that V = TV,D(V). Thus, use can be made of the objective-perturbed,
dual Bellman operator TV,D. The convenient feature of this operator is that it can be
written as TV,D = {T
V,D
j }j∈K,
T
V,D
j (W)(ζ) = inf
RM
+
∑
k∈K
 
Jk(ζ,η) + βPW(ζ′
j,k(ζ,η))
 
πj,k, (70)
where:
Jk(ζ,η) = sup
A(  θk)
 
f(  θk,  ak) + ∑
m∈M
ηm
πj,k
gm
0,k(  ak) + ∑
i∈I1
ζiri(  θk,  ak) + ∑
i∈I2
ζi
kri(  θk,  ak)
 
.
Consequently, the "supremum" operation is cleanly distributed across periods and the
dynamic link is purely through the weight ζ′ and the multiplier choice η. If W = {Wj}
with each Wj convex, real-valued and, hence, continuous on RN, then T
V,D
j (W) is easily
shown to be convex, real-valued and continuous on RN also.
A remaining difﬁculty is that the function V is unbounded, even if real-valued. One
approach to dealing with this is to enlarge the space of candidate value functions to in-
clude those that are norm-bounded with respect to a weighting function and then to show
that the growth of optimal multipliers is bounded with respect to this norm. This is the
approach taken by Marcet and Marimon (2011). An alternative approach is to consider
candidate value functions contained between two bounding functions. If the bounds are
tight enough, then the relevant space of candidate value functions may a complete metric
space with respect to the usual sup-metric. We sketch this approach below.23
Assume the existence of constraint functions G and G such that:
{α ∈ Ω|G(α) ≥ 0} ⊂ {α ∈ Ω|G(α) ≥ 0} ⊂ {α ∈ Ω|G(α) ≥ 0}.
Let Ω(α) denote all continuations of a given plan α and let
Ω = {α ∈ Ω|∀α′ ∈ Ω(α),G(α′) ≥ 0}.
Ω isdeﬁnedanalogouslyfrom G. Then Ω ⊂ Ω1 ⊂ Ω. For each j, deﬁnethecorresponding
23The two approaches may be combined, see Sleet and Yeltekin (2010a). In addition, Sleet and Yeltekin
(2010a) show that Marcet and Marimon’s approach is equivalent to restricting attention to candidate value
functions within {W : RN → R,supζ∈RN |W(ζ)|/ (1,ζ)  < ∞} with metric induced by the weight func-
tion τ(ζ) =  (1,ζ) . Sleet and Yeltekin (2010a) use more general and ﬂexible weight functions.
46more and less constrained problems:
Vj(ζ) = sup
Ω ∑
k∈K
Fk(α)πj,k + ∑
i∈I1
ζi ∑
k∈K
Ri
k(α)πj,k + ∑
i∈I2
∑
k∈K
ζi
kRi
k(α)πj,k
Vj(ζ) = sup
Ω
∑
k∈K
Fk(α)πj,k + ∑
i∈I1
ζi ∑
k∈K
Ri
k(α)πj,k + ∑
i∈I2
∑
k∈K
ζi
kRi
k(α)πj,k.
Suppose that Vj and Vj are convex and real-valued on RN. Deﬁne:
V := {W = {Wk}|each Wk : RN → R is convex and V ≤ W ≤ V}.
It is evident that V ∈ V. Also,
Vj ≤ T
V,D
j (V) ≤ T
V,D
j (V) ≤ T
V,D
j (V) ≤ Vj, (71)
(see Lemma A1 in the Appendix for the proof), so that given the preceding discussion:
TV,D : V → V.
Assumption 11. There is an L ∈ R+ such that: sup(j,ζ)∈Z Vj(ζ) − Vj(ζ) < L.
Given a pair of bounding problems with convex value functions satisfying Assump-
tion 11, deﬁne V as above and let d : V × V → R+ be such that d(W,W′) = supZ
|Wj(ζ) −W′
j(ζ)|, W, W′ ∈ V. (V,d) is then a complete metric space. A mapping T : V →
V is contractive if for any W and W′ in V, d(T(W),T(W′)) ≤ δd(W,W′), δ ∈ (0,1). The
following result is now routine.
Proposition 15. Assumethe existenceof apairof more and lessconstrainedproblemswithconvex
value functions satisfying Assumption 11. Deﬁne V as above. Then TV,D is contractive on (V,d)
and if W0 ∈ V, the sequence {Ws} with Ws+1 = TV,DWs converges in the d-metric to V. Also,
V is the unique function in V satisfying V = TV,D(V).
The remaining question concerns the determination of good bounding problems. This
issue is taken up in Sleet and Yeltekin (2010a).
11 Approximation
Convex/concave functions lend themselves to piecewise linear inner and outer approxi-
mations.24 As emphasized by Judd et al (2003), such approximation of iterates interacts
24An outer (resp. inner) approximation to a convex function lies everywhere below (resp. above) this
function. An outer (resp. inner) approximation to a concave function lies everywhere above (resp. below)
this function.
47with the monotone nature of the Bellman operator to yield inner or outer limiting approx-
imations to the true value function (given concavity or convexity).
Let −f ∈ FN and f∗ = C[−f]. A piecewise linear outer approximation   f to the concave
function f can be obtained by ﬁxing a ﬁnite set of points {  zq}q∈Q in RN and forming the
"approximate conjugate":
−  f(w) = sup
Q
{ w,  zq  − f∗(  zq)} ≤ sup
RN
{ w,z  − f∗(z)} = −f(w).
Each hq(w) =  w,  zq  − f∗(  zq) may be interpreted as a hyperplane with normal   zq. Thus,
−  f(w) is the convex hull formed from these hyperplanes. Alternatively, substituting for
f∗,   f may be determined as:   f(w) = −D[−f](w), where D(−f)(w) = supQ infRN{ w −
w′,  zq  − f(w′)}. The outer approximation operator, D, is a composition of the approxi-
mate conjugate and conjugate operators and is monotone increasing on FN (when this set
is ordered in the usual pointwise way).
A piecewise linear inner approximation   f∗ to the convex function f∗ may be obtained
by forming the conjugate of the approximation   f,   f∗(z) = C[−  f](z) = D[f∗](z) =
supRN infQ{ w,(z −   zq)  + f∗(  zq)} ≥ f∗(z). Thus, the inner approximation operator D
reverses the composition of approximate conjugate and conjugate operators relative to
the outer approximation operator D.   f∗ also has a geometric interpretation: its epigraph
is the convex hull of the union of halﬂines {(  zq,v)|f∗(  zq) ≤ v}. Of course, by applying
D to −f and D to f∗, inner approximations to f and outer approximations to f∗ may be
obtained. Figure 4 illustrates the application of D and D.
  z1
  z2
  z3
  z4
f
w
(a) −D(−f)
  z1   z2   z3   z4   z5
f ∗
z
(b) D(f∗)
Figure 4: Outer and inner approximation
48The operators D and D may be combined with the Bellman operators described in
previous sections. Iteration of the resulting approximate Bellman operators can yield
an epiconvergent value iteration whose limit is an outer or inner approximation to the
true value function. We sketch an example in which D is combined with TV = {TV
j }.
Let {  zq}Q denote a ﬁnite set of weights and consider a piecewise linear function W0 ≥ V
satisfying for each j, W0
j = D[W0
j ] ≥ TV
j (W0) = W1
j . Then, the monotonicity of D, TV and
the ﬁxed point property of V implies: W0
j = D[W0
j ] ≥ D[TV
j (W0)] =   W1
j ≥ Vj, where   W
p
j ,
p = 1,2,..., is the p-th iterate of the approximate Bellman operator. The monotonicity of
the approximate operator DTV then implies that the sequence of approximations {   Wp}
satisﬁes: W ≥   Wp ≥   Wp+1 ≥ ... ≥ V. Thus, the pointwise (and epigraphical) limit of the
sequence limp   Wp is an inner approximation (upper bound) to V.
12 Conclusion
This paper derives and relates alternative recursive formulations of dynamic incentive
problems. Under appropriate separability assumptions, primal formulations that use
promisesasstate variablesareavailable. Theseformulations incorporate promise-keeping
and recursive incentive constraints either or both of which may be dualized to obtain re-
lated recursive dual problems. To recover primal values, from a recursive dual problem
additional assumptions are required (e.g. concave or convex-likeness). Still further as-
sumptions (e.g. strict concavity) or an extension of the methods described here25 are
needed to obtain optimal policies. These represent disadvantages of the recursive dual
approaches. On the other hand, recursive dual problems are less likely to involve value
functions that are extended real valued.
Ourresultsindicatetheextenttowhichrecursive primalandrecursive dualapproaches
can be interchanged and clarify the connections between approaches taken elsewhere in
the literature. In addition, our analysis of epiconvergent value iteration relaxes bounded-
ness assumptions needed for contraction mapping based analyses of value iteration.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Prop. 1 Let a′ = (a′
0,{a′
k}) ∈ Ω1 and for k ∈ K deﬁne w′
k = {gk,n(a′
k)}. Then
since a′ ∈ Ω1 implies for k ∈ K, gM+k
k (a′
k) ≥ 0, a′
k ∈ Φk(w′
k). Hence, Sk(w′
k) ≥ fk(a′
k).
Also, since for each m, gm
0 (a′
0) + ∑
K
k=1 ∑
N
n=1 w′
k,nqm
k,n = gm
0 (a′
0) + ∑
K
k=1 ∑
N
n=1 gk,n(a′
k)qm
k,n ≥
510, (a′
0,{w′
k}) ∈ Ψ0 and so supΨ0 f0(a0) + ∑
K
k=1 Sk(wk)q0
k ≥ f0(a′
0) + ∑
K
k=1 Sk(w′
k)q0
k ≥
∑
K
k=0 fk(a′
k)q0
k. Since a′ was an arbitrary element of Ω1, supΦ0 f0(a0)+ ∑
K
k=1 Sk(wk)q0
k ≥ P.
Conversely, if (a′
0,{w′
k}) ∈ Ψ0, then either Φk(w′
k) = ∅ for some k ∈ K in which case
f0(a0)+∑
K
k=1 Sk(wk)q0
k = −∞ ≤ P or Φk(w′
k)  = ∅ for all k ∈ K. In the latter case, for each
k ∈ K, let a′
k ∈ Φk(w′
k), then (a′
0,{a′
k}) ∈ Ω1 and so P ≥ f(a′
0)q0
0 + ∑
K
k=0 fk(a′
k)q0
k. Since
the a′
k are arbitrary elements of Φk(w′
k), P ≥ f(a′
0)q0
0 + ∑
K
k=0 Sk(w′
k)q0
k. Since (a′
0,{w′
k}) is
an arbitrary element of Ψ0, P ≥ supΨ0 f(a0)q0
0 + ∑
K
k=0 Sk(wk)q0
k.  
Proof of Prop. 7 Following a similar argument to that used in proving Proposition 1,
V0(z) = sup
Ψ0
f0(a0)q0
0 +
K
∑
k=1
Sk(wk)q0
k +
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
gh
0(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nph
k,n
 
.
Incorporating the ﬁrst period incentive constraints into a Lagrangian and rearranging:
V0(z) = sup
A0×RKN
inf
RM
+
f0(a0)q0
0 +
K
∑
k=1
Sk(wk)q0
k +
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
gh
0(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nph
k,n
 
+
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n
 
= sup
A0×RKN
inf
RM
+
f0(a0)q0
0 +
N
∑
h=1
zhgh
0(a0) +
M
∑
m=1
ηmgm
0 (a0)
+
K
∑
k=1
Sk(wk)q0
k +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
 
M
∑
m=1
ηmqm
k,n +
N
∑
h=1
zhph
k,n
 
wk,n
Since −S ∈ W, for each k ∈ K, Sk(wk) = infRN −∑
N
n=1 wk,nzk,n + Vk(zk) and so, after
substitution and rearrangement,
V0(z) = sup
A0×RKN
inf
RM
+×RKN
f0(a0)q0
0 +
N
∑
h=1
zhgh
0(a0) +
M
∑
m=1
ηmgm
0 (a0)
+
K
∑
k=1
Vk(zk)q0
k +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
 
ζ′
k,n(z,η) − zk,n
 
q0
kwk,n
as required.  
52Proof of Prop. 11. Fix W ∈ W0. Using the deﬁnitions of TV,D and ζ′ and rearranging:
TV,D(C[W])(z) = inf
RM
+
 
sup
a0
 
f0(a0)q0
0 +
M
∑
m=1
ηmgm
0 (a0)qm
0 +
N
∑
h=1
zhg0,h(a0)
 
+ ∑
k∈K
sup
RN
{ ζ′
k(z,η),w  + Wk(w)}q0
k
 
= inf
RM
+
sup
A0×RKN
  
f0(a0)q0
0 +
K
∑
k=1
Wk(wk)q0
k
 
+
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
g0,h(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nph
k,n
 
+
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0)qm
0 +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n
  
.
Combining this with C[TV,D(C[−W])](w) = −supRN
 
∑
N
h=1 zhwh − TV,D(C[−W])(z)
 
and rearranging yields:
−C[TV,D(C[−W])](w) = inf
RN



−
N
∑
h=1
zhwh + inf
RM
+
sup
A0×RKN
  
f0(a0)q0
0 +
K
∑
k=1
Wk(wk)q0
k
 
+
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
g0,h(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nph
k,n
 
+
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0)qm
0 +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n
   
.
= inf
RN×RM
+
sup
A0×RKN
  
f0(a0)q0
0 +
K
∑
k=1
Wk(wk)q0
k
 
+
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
g0,h(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nph
k,n − wh
 
+
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0)qm
0 +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n
  
= TS,D(W)(w).
Now, TS(−C[W])(w) = supΦ(w) f0(a0)q0
0 − ∑
K
k=1 supRN
 
∑
N
n=1 wk,nzk,n + W(zk)
 
and so,
C[−TS(−C[W])](z) = sup
RN
 
N
∑
h=1
zhwh + sup
Φ0(w)
 
f0(a0)q0
0 −
K
∑
k=1
sup
RN
 
N
∑
n=1
wk,nzk,n +W(zk)
 
q0
k
  
.
Collecting the supremum operations together and usingthe deﬁnition of Φ0 and Ψ0 gives:
C[−TS(−C[W])](z) = sup
Ψ0
 
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
g0,h(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nph
k,n
 
+ f0(a0)q0
0
−
K
∑
k=1
sup
RN
 
N
∑
n=1
wk,nzk,n +W(zk)
 
q0
k
 
.
53Hence, bringing the incentive constraints into the Lagrangian:
C[−TS(−C[W])](z) = sup
A0×RKN
inf
RM
+
 
f0(a0)a0
0 +
N
∑
h=1
zh
 
g0,h(a0) +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nph
k,n
 
−
K
∑
k=1
sup
RN
 
N
∑
n=1
wk,nzk,n − W(zk)
 
q0
k +
M
∑
m=1
ηm
 
gm
0 (a0)qm
0 +
K
∑
k=1
N
∑
n=1
wk,nqm
k,n
  
.
Grouping inﬁmum operations together and rearranging gives:
C[−TS(−C[W])](z) = sup
A0×RKN
inf
RM
+ ×RKN
  
f0(a0)q0
0 +
N
∑
h=1
zhg0,h(a0) +
M
∑
m=1
ηmgm
0 (a0)qm
0
 
+
K
∑
k=1
 
N
∑
n=1
wk,n
 
N
∑
h=1
zh ph
k,n
q0
k
+
M
∑
m=1
ηm
qm
k,n
q0
k
− zk,n
 
+W(zk)
 
q0
k
 
= TV(W)(z).
The remaining equalities in the proposition are immediate.  
Proof of Lemma 2. If W ≥ W′ and levuUj(W)(w, ) ⊂ B for all w ∈ V a neighborhood of
  w, then levuUj(W′)(w, ) ⊂ levuUj(W)(w, ) ⊂ B. Thus, if Uj(W)(w, ) is level bounded
locally in w, so is Uj(W′)(w).  
Proof of Lemma 3. Follows from Rockafellar and Wets (1998), Theorem 1.17, p. 16.  
Proof of Theorem 8. TS is readily shown to be monotone on −W0 (i.e. S′ ≥ S′′ implies
TS(S′) ≥ TS(S′′)). Consider the interval of functions I := {S′|S0 ≥ S′ ≥ S} ⊂ −W0.
TS : I → I since, using 1) and 2) in the proposition, the monotonicity of TS and the fact
that S is a ﬁxed point of TS, S0 ≥ TSS0 ≥ TSS′ ≥ TSS = S. Thus, {Sn} ⊂ I. Moreover,
the sequence of functions {Sn} is a decreasing sequence since S0 ≥ TSS0 = S1 and, by
monotonicity of TS, Sn ≥ Sn+1 implies Sn+1 = TSSn ≥ TSSn+1 = Sn+2. For each j
and w, {Sn,j(w)} is a decreasing sequence bounded below by Sj(w) ∈ R ∪ {−∞} and so
limn Sn,j(w) = S∞,j(w) ≥ Sj(w). It follows that Sn converges pointwise to the function
S∞ = {S∞,j(w)}. Also, Sn ≥ S∞ implies that for all n, Sn+1 = TSSn ≥ TSS∞. Hence,
S∞ = limSn+1 ≥ TSS∞.
Note that ∞ > S0,j ≥ S1,j = TS
j (S0) ≥ Uj(S0) and S1,j ≥ Sj(w). It follows that
54Uj(S0) is everywhere less than ∞ and is somewhere more than −∞. By assumption,
Uj(S0) is level bounded locally and since each f(  θk, ) and S0,k are upper semicontinuous
and Graph Φj is closed, Uj(S0) is upper semicontinuous. It follows from Lemma 3 that
if Uj(S0)(w) ≥ S∞,j(w) > −∞ that argminUj(S0)(w, ) is nonempty and compact. In
addition, argminUj(S0)(w, ) ⊂ levS∞,j(w)Uj(S0)(w, ), where the latter set is nonempty
and, since Uj(S0)(w, ) is upper semicontinuous and level bounded, compact. Also by
Lemma 3, S1,j is upper semicontinuous and, since S0 ≥ S1, by Lemma 2 Uj(S1) is level
bounded locally in w. Since ∞ > S1,j ≥ S2,j = TS
j (S1) ≥ Uj(S1) and S2,j ≥ Sj(w)
implies that Uj(S1) is everywhere less than ∞ and is somewhere more than −∞. Re-
peatedly applying these arguments, each Sn is found to be upper semicontinuous and
each Uj(Sn) is found to be upper semicontinuous, level bounded locally, everywhere less
than ∞ and somewhere more than −∞. In addition, if S∞,j(w) > −∞, there is a se-
quence (an,w′
n) ∈ argminUj(Sn)(w) ⊂ levS∞,j(w)Uj(S0)(w, ). Since levS∞,j(w)Uj(S0)(w, )
is compact, the sequence {an,w′
n} admits a convergent subsequence {anv,w′
nv} with limit
(a∞,w′
∞) ∈ levS∞,j(w)Uj(S0)(w, ). Now,
TS
j (S∞)(w) = sup
(a,w′)
Uj(S∞)(w,a,w′) ≥ Uj(S∞)(w,a∞,w′
∞) = lim
v→∞
Uj(Snv)(w,a∞,w′
∞)
≥ lim
v→∞
limsup
  v≥v
Uj(Snv)(w,an  v,w′
n  v) ≥ lim
v→∞
limsup
  v≥v
Uj(Sn  v)(w,an  v,w′
n  v)
= limsup
  v≥v
Uj(Sn  v)(w,an  v,w′
n  v) = limsup
  v≥v
Sn  v+1(w) = S∞(w).
Combining inequalities S∞ = TSS∞. The sequence {Sn} is a decreasing sequence of up-
per semicontinuous functions with pointwise limit S∞. Thus, {−Sn} is an increasing
sequence of lower semicontinuous functions with pointwise limit −S∞. By Rockafellar
and Wets (1998), Proposition 7.4(d), the sequence {−Sn} epiconverges to supn[cl(−Sn)].
But since each −Sn is proper and lower semicontinuous, cl(−Sn) = −Sn and since the
sequence is increasing supn(−Sn) = −S∞, the result follows.  
Proof of Theorem 9. By Theorem 8, S∞, the epi-limit of {Sn}, satisﬁes S∞ ≥ S. It re-
mains only to show the reverse inequality. If S∞,j(w) = −∞, then immediately S∞,j(w) =
Sj(w) = −∞. Suppose that S∞,j(w) > −∞. By Theorem 8, TS
j S∞(w) = S∞,j(w). Also,
each S∞,j is upper semicontinuous (as the pointwise limit of a decreasing sequence of up-
per semicontinuous functions) and bounded above by S0,j. Hence, Uj(S∞) is upper semi-
continuous and level bounded locally in w. and applying Lemma 3, there is a (a∗
1,w∗
2) ∈
55Φj(w) such that:
S∞,j(w) =
K
∑
k=1
[f(  θk,a∗
1(  θk)) + βPS∞,k(w∗
2(  θk))]πj,k.
Since S∞,j(w) > −∞, each S∞,k(w∗
2(  θk)) > −∞. Repeatedly applying this argument at
successive nodesgivesasequence{a∗
t ,w∗
t+1} suchthatforeachθt−1, (a∗
t (θt−1),w∗
t+1(θt−1))
∈ Φk(θt−1)(w∗
t (θt−1)), where w∗
1(θ0) = w, k(θ0) = j and k(θt−1), t > 0, gives the index of
the θt−1 shock. Also for each T,
S∞,j(w) = E
 
T
∑
t=1
βt−1
P f(θt,a∗
t(θt))|θ0 =   θj
 
+ βT+1
P E
 
S∞(w∗
T+1(θT))|θ0 =   θj
 
. (72)
Hence, using the fact that S∞ is bounded above (since it is upper semicontinuous and co-
ercive) gives: S∞,j(w) ≤ limsupT→∞ E
 
∑
T
t=1 βt−1
P f(θt,a∗
t (θt))|θ0 =   θj
 
. In addition, since
each (a∗
t (θt−1),w∗
t+1(θt−1)) ∈ Φk(θt−1)(w∗
t (θt−1),
wi = E
 
T
∑
t=1
ri(θt,a∗
t(θt))|θ0 =   θj
 
+ βT+1
A E[w
i,∗
T+1(θT)|θ0 =   θj], i ∈ I1
wi
k = E
 
T
∑
t=1
ri(θt,a∗
t(θt))|θ1 =   θk
 
+ βT+1
A E
 
∑
l
w
i,∗
T+1,l(θT)π(  θl|θT)|θ1 =   θk
 
, i ∈ I2,k ∈ K.
Since S0 is coercive in expectation and S0 ≥ S∞, S∞ is coercive in expectation as well.
Hence, if lim βT
AE[ w∗
T+1 |θ0 =   θj]  = 0, then limβT
PE[S∞(w∗
T+1(θT))|θ0 =   θj] = −∞. But
this, eq. (72) and the fact that f is bounded above, contradict S∞,j(w) ≥ Sj(w) > −∞.
Thus, we infer that limsupT→∞ βT
A E[w∗
T+1|θ0 =   θj]  = 0 and so
wi = lim
T→∞
E
 
T
∑
t=1
ri(θt,a∗
t(θt))|θ0 =   θj
 
and wi
k = lim
T→∞
E
 
T
∑
t=1
ri(θt,a∗
t (θt))|θ1 =   θk
 
.
Bysimilarlogic, eachw∗
t+1(θt) satisﬁes: w
i,∗
t+1(θt) = limT→∞ E
 
∑
T
s=1ri(θt+s,a∗
t+s(θt+s))|θt
 
and w
i,∗
t+1,k = limT→∞ E
 
∑
T
s=1 ri(θt+s,a∗
t+s(θt+s))|θt,θt+1 =   θk
 
. Combining these equali-
ties with (a∗
t (θt−1, ), w∗
t+1(θt−1, )) ∈ Φk(θt−1)(w∗
t−1(θt−1)) ensures that {a∗
t } ∈ Ω1,j(w)
and so is feasible for 60. Thus, Sj(w) ≥ S∞,j(w) ≥ Sj(w) > −∞.  
Proposition A1 Vj ≤ T
V,D
j V ≤ Vj = T
V,D
j V ≤ T
V,D
j V ≤ Vj.
56Proof. First,
Vj(ζ) = sup
Ω ∑
k∈K
Fk(α)πj,k + ∑
i∈I1
ζi ∑
k∈K
Ri
k(α)πj,k + ∑
i∈I2
∑
k∈K
ζi
kRi
k(α)πj,k + ∑
m∈M
ηmGm(α)
≤ sup
{α|G(α)≥0}∩Ω2
∑
k∈K
Fk(α)πj,k + ∑
i∈I1
ζi ∑
k∈K
Ri
k(α)πj,k + ∑
i∈I2
∑
k∈K
ζi
kRi
k(α)πj,k
= inf
η∈RM
+
sup
Ω2
∑
k∈K
Fk(α)πj,k + ∑
i∈I1
ζi ∑
k∈K
Ri
k(α)πj,k + ∑
i∈I2
∑
k∈K
ζi
kRi
k(α)πj,k + ∑
m∈M
ηmGm(α),
where Ω2 = {α = (a,α′) ∈ Ω0| each α′
k ∈ Ω}. Rearrangements similar to those in the text
and the deﬁnition of V imply that the last expression equals T
V,D
j V(ζ). Hence, the ﬁrst
inequality in the proposition holds. The monotonicity of T
V,D
j , V ≥ V and Vj = T
V,D
j V
gives T
V,D
j V ≤ Vj = T
V,D
j V. The other inequalities follow by similar reasoning.  
Appendix B: Duality
The problems from the preceding sections incorporate ﬁrst period incentive and, in some
cases, auxiliarysecondperiod promise-keepingconditions. Relationsbetweentheseprob-
lems can be expressed in terms of the value functions associated with perturbations of
these constraints and their conjugates. The results underpinning these relations are clas-
sical and are collected into two theorems given below. The ﬁrst considers a family of
optimizations subject to parameterized equality and inequality constraints.26
Theorem B0. (Dualizing all constraints) Let Ω be a non-empty subset of a vector space,
f : Ω → R, g : Ω → RN and h : Ω → RM. Let:
ψ(w,δ) = sup
{x∈Ω|g(x)=w,h(x)≥δ}
f(x), (73)
and
ϕ(z,η) = sup
x∈Ω
f(x) +  z, g(x)  +  η,h(x) , (74)
where by convention ψ equals −∞ if the constraint set is non-empty. Assume that −ψ ∈
FNM
0 , then: 1) ϕ = C[−ψ] ∈ FNM and 2) −ψ = C[ϕ] = C2[−ψ] if −ψ ∈ FNM.
Itfollowsfrom Theorem B0that, modulosign changes, the"objective-perturbed" value
function ϕ is the conjugate of the "constraint-perturbed" value function ψ and is in FNM
if −ψ is in FNM
0 . Conversely, −ψ is the conjugate of ϕ if −ψ ∈ FNM. Writing ψ(w,δ) in
26Theorem B0 is classical. For a related proofs see Borwein and Lewis (2006), p. 90.
57terms of the associated Lagrangian gives:
ψ(w,δ) = sup
x∈Ω
inf
(z,η)∈RN×RM
+
f(x) +  z, g(x) − w  +  η,h(x) − δ . (75)
Writing −C2[−ψ](w,δ) out explicitly:
−C2[−ψ](w,δ) = inf
(z,η)∈RN×RM
+
sup
x∈Ω
f(x) +  z, g(x) − w  +  η,h(x) − δ , (76)
it follows that there is no difference between primal and dual values in (73) if and only
if, after a sign change, the associated primal value function ψ equals its biconjugate. This
result holds at all (w,δ) if −ψ ∈ FNM.
Theorem B1 below decomposes the conjugation operations of Theorem B0 in various
useful ways. Parts A1)-A2) consider the dualization of the equality constraint only. Part
A3) treats the conjugation operation C[−ψ] recursively, decomposing it into a supremum
operation over w and then δ. Part A4) dualizes the inequality constraint only (leaving the
equality constraint inside the objective); Part A5) dualizes the inequality constraint after
the objective has been perturbed with the equality constraint function g.
Theorem B1. (Dualizing subsets of constraints) Let Ω, f, g, h and ψ be as before and let:
γ(z,δ) = sup
{x∈Ω|h(x)≥δ}
f(x) +  z, g(x) .
For given δ ∈ RM, assume that −ψ( ,δ) ∈ FN
0 , then:
A1) γ( ,δ) = C[−ψ( ,δ)] ∈ FN and −ψ( ,δ) = C[γ( ,δ)] if −ψ( ,δ) ∈ FN;
A2) thereisnodualitygapwith respecttotheequalityconstraintif: −ψ(w,δ) = −C[γ( ,δ)](w) =
infz∈RN sup{x∈Ω|h(x)≥δ} f(x) +  z, g(x) − w ;
A3) C[−ψ](z,η) = C[γ(z, )](η);
A4) C2[−ψ(w, )](δ) = infη∈RM
+ sup{x∈Ω|g(x)=w} f(x) +  η,h(x) − δ ;
A5) C2[−γ(z, )](δ) = infη∈RM
+ supx∈Ω f(x) +  z, g(x)  +  η,h(x) − δ .
The preceding results lead us to focus on cases in which value functions are proper,
convex and lower semicontinuous. In particular, since equality constraints are used to de-
ﬁne state variables in our decompositions, we will be interested in cases in which −ψ( ,0)
lies in FN.27 We brieﬂy review some assumptions on primitives that ensure this.
27In other words, −ψ( ,0) = C[−ψ( ,0)]. We will also be interested in situations in which for all w,
58Properness Properness of −ψ is ensured if the constraint set is non-empty at some pa-
rameter pair (w,δ) and f is bounded on each {x ∈ Ω|g(x) = w,h(x) ≥ δ}.
Convexity/concavity Convexityof−ψ( ,0) (concavity ofψ( ,0)) isensuredif(f, g,h,Ω)
deﬁne a family of convex-like problems. Formally, let Ω1(w) = {x ∈ Ω|g(x) = w,h(x) ≥
δ} and deﬁne   f such that   f(w, x) = f(x) if x ∈ Ω1(w) and   f(w, x) = −∞ other-
wise. The family of problems supΩ1(w) f(x) = sup   f(w, x) is said to be convex-like
if for all pairs (w1, x1) and (w2, x2) and numbers λ ∈ [0,1], there is an xλ such that
  f(λw1 +(1−λ)w2, xλ) ≥ λ  f(w1, x1)+(1−λ)  f(w2, x2).We say that (f, g,h,Ω) is concave-
like if (−f, g,h,Ω) is convex-like. A well known sufﬁcient condition for convex-likeness
is that the graph of Ω1 is a convex set and f is concave. Convexity of Graph Ω1 is ensured
if Ω is convex, g is afﬁne and h is concave. However, weaker conditions for the convexity
of −ψ( ,0) are available see Sleet (2011).
Lower semicontinuity If −ψ( ,0) is convex and its effective domain is all of RN, then
it is immediately continuous and, hence, lower semicontinuous. If its effective domain
is a strict subset of RN, then additional assumptions are required. These relate to the
structure of the objective and constraint function level sets.28 Following Rockafellar and
Wets (1998), −ψ( ,0) is lower semicontinuous if Ω is a subset of ﬁnite dimensional vector
space and   f is proper, upper semicontinuous and uniformly level bounded in x locally in
w.29 The latter property is ensured if the level sets of the Lagrangian λ0f(x) +  z, g(x)  +
 η,h(x)  are compact for some (λ0,z,η), see Borwein and Lewis (2006). This in turn is
guaranteed if either f, g or h have compact level sets.30
Primaland dualattainment The above mentioned compactness conditions on level sets
used to obtain lower semicontinuity of −ψ( ,0) also ensure primal attainment whenever
−ψ(w,0) is ﬁnite and the constraint set Ω1(w) is non-empty. An alternative route to a
zero duality gap is via dual attainment. There is strong duality (i.e. a zero duality gap and
dual attainment) with respect to inequality constraint perturbations at (w,0) if −ψ(w, )
is subdifferentiable at 0. In this case, the subdifferentials of the value function are the
minimizing multipliers of the dual. Since convex functions are subdifferentiable on the
−ψ(w,0) = C[−ψ(w, )](0) and for all z, γ(z,0) = C[γ(z, )](0).
28The (upper) level set of f : X → R is given by levr f{x ∈ X|f(x) ≥ r}.
29  f is uniformly level bounded in x locally in w if for each w ∈ RN and r ∈ R, there is a neighborhood
N(w) of w and a bounded set B ⊂ X such that {x|  f(w′,x) ≥ r} ⊂ B, w′ ∈ N(w).
30That is, if Ω is ﬁnite dimensional, are upper semicontinuous and have bounded level sets. If these
functions are concave, then boundedness of level sets is equivalent to level coercivity: lim x →∞
f(x)
 x  < 0.
59interior of their effective domain, a sufﬁcient condition for strong duality at a (w,0) is that
the −ψ(w, ) is convex and 0 lies in the interior of Dom −ψ(w, ). A classical condition
for ensuring the latter is the so called Slater condition which requires the existence of an
x ∈ Ω ∩ {g(x) = w} satisfying h(x) > 0.
Coincidence of primal and dual solutions Conditions for the coincidence of optimal
primal and dual solutions (as opposed to values) are more stringent. Consider the dual
pair (75)-(76) (at some (w,δ)). If strong duality holds, x∗ is maximal for (75) and (z∗,η∗)
is minimal for (76), then x∗ maximizes L(x;z∗,η∗) = f(x) +  z∗, g(x)  +  η∗,h(x)  over
Ω. However, L( ;z∗,η∗) may admit additional maximizers that do not solve (75). A max-
imizer x∗ of L( ;z∗,η∗) solves (75) if (z∗,η∗) minimizes L(x∗; ), i.e. (x∗,z∗,η∗) is a saddle
point, or if strong duality holds, (z∗,η∗) solves (76) and x∗ is the unique maximizer of
L( ,z∗,η∗) (which is, for example, the case case if L( ,z∗,η∗) is strictly concave). These
ideas are further developed in Messner et al (2011) and Sleet and Yeltekin (2010a). Re-
cently, Cole and Kubler (2010) and Marimon et al (2011) have shown how the optimal
policy might be recovered in non-strictly concave recursive problems (in which checking
complementary slackness is not straightforward).
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